«Добруджанське питання» в зовнішній політиці Румунії та позиція Великої Британії напередодні та в період роботи Паризької мирної конференції (1918–1919)
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Дата
2019
Науковий керівник
Укладач
Редактор
Назва журналу
ISSN
E-ISSN
Назва тому
Видавець
Одеський національний університет імені І. І. Мечникова
Анотація
У представленій статті автором висвітлюються основні вектори
зовнішньої політики Румунії щодо Південної Добруджі в 1918–1919 рр.
Проаналізовано і визначено спроби Бухаресту збільшити території за
рахунок територій сусідніх держав. Відображена діяльність та боротьба румунських дипломатів в напрямку збільшення територіальних
надбань Румунії в період роботи Паризької мирної конференції, коли
держави-переможниці підтримали приєднання до балканських держав
низки болгарських територій.. Розглядається підготовка та підписання Нейїського мирного договору. В статті підкреслюється, що румунські політики і дипломати були непоступливими щодо пом’якшення
умов мирного договору з Болгарією, зокрема щодо питання статусу
Південної Добруджі, який на той час готувався в Парижі. Для цього
використовували всі сили та можливості для того, щоб прихилити на
бік максимальної підтримки румунських національних інтересів якомога більше реальних учасників мирних домовленостей, зокрема Велику
Британію. Антиболгарська пропаганда і агітація, яка розгорнулася в
Великій Британії, суттєво посприяли вирішенню всіх цих питань. У
статті подана характеристика відношення британських державних
діячів до Румунії одразу після закінчення війни, напередодні і в час робо ти Паризької мирної конференції. Аналізуючи позицію Великої Британії
відносно питання статусу Південної Добруджі в цей період, автор констатує, що вона була двоякою та непередбачливою. Розкрито складне
становище Румунії в системі міжнародних відносин після закінчення
Першої світової війни, з якою країни-переможниці будували свої стосунки методом поступок, скоригувавши на її користь Нейїський мирний
договір. Після війни за безпосереднього сприяння Лондону та Парижу
Румунія перетворилась на велику чорноморську та балканську державу.
In the presented article the author highlights the main direction of its foreign policy Romania on Southern Dobrudja lands at the end of the First World War and the period of the Paris Peace Conference (1918–1919 ). The article highlights the work and the struggle for peace with the Balkan states of Romania and Britain politicians, diplomats and civil society towards preserving peaceful relations in the period of operation of the Paris Peace Conference. The most radical departure from the principle of national self-determination which practiced Foreign-Office came in relation to Romania’s frontier with Bulgaria. The tasks are to characterize the content of the work of the Romanian diplomatic commission in the direction of the defending the rights to South Dobrudja and the determination of the position of Great Britain as for territorial independence of the region. The main thesis of the article is that after First World War Romania sought to large an alliance with t least on of the Great Powers in case of an attack on South Dobrudja, in this sense, Romania’s diplomatic success was only partial. The Romanian government realized that only the permission of the Great Powers, such as Great Britain, would strength its presence in the region. The Great Britain treated ambiguously towards such aspirations of Romania. For the first, Foreign Office was not forgotten for Bucharest the separate peace with the Central Powers in 1918. For the second, Britain diplomatic and military mission at Southern Dobrudja did not take the politics of the terror of Romanian in Bessarabia. The Great Britain provided a summary of the position in Southern Dobrudja: provisional British military occupation is the only possible solution for the moment, in spite of the unrest this causes to the Rumanian Government. From the first of the being in Paris, the Romanian diplomats were sounded actively the question how the Great Britain and France would see the future status of Southern Dobrudja. The Romanian demand for Southern Dobrudja was strongly citing national self-determination and protecting peace in Balkan. Most in the British delegation hoped that this could be agreed. However, the British and French refused absolutely to compel an ally to surrender territory to an enemy. The decision, British politics believed, lay with Romania: such readjustment could only be made after friendly conversations with the Rumanian Government. It is important that the Rumanian politics themselves should be a consenting party to the cession of Southern Dobrudja and that Romanians should not be left with the feeling that they have been robbed by their Allies to placate their enemies. In the Parice Peace Conference Foreign Office took the legalistic view that, because Southern Dobrudja was secured by Romania before the war, its future was beyond the remit of the Peace Conference. The Britain Commission stated in its projects that it was not authorized to recommend a modification of the frontier which would involve the cession to an enemy State of a territory forming de facto et de jure an integral part of an Allied State. The Romanians, angry about losing part of the Banat, never offered to give up Southern Dobrudja. The Americans pushed their view in the Council of Heads of Delegations between July and November, but the British were unyielding. The issue was not even mentioned in the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria in November. Thus, in the words of a member of the Bulgarian Delegation, the settlement proclaimed the principle that no land can be claimed from the victors. It has been argued here that Bucharest gained territory not because of the wartime treaty that promised her so much, and not because of the dubious diplomatic skills of Romanian delegation, but because the Roma nians had a strong case and it was effectively presented by Romanophiles like Britain delegation. There was one other reason, however, that tended to shine its harsh light on every issue, the simple idea that these people are our friends and those are our enemies. This was stated most starkly and frequently by the French, but it was also evident in the British unwillingness to coerce the Romanians over Southern Dobrudja. The consequence of making a settlement which dealt severely with losers was that they became revisionist and eventually allied themselves with those who would undo the hated treaties. Romania remains much bigger than she was in 1918, but the settlement that created Greater Romania did not survive the vengeance of its enemies.
In the presented article the author highlights the main direction of its foreign policy Romania on Southern Dobrudja lands at the end of the First World War and the period of the Paris Peace Conference (1918–1919 ). The article highlights the work and the struggle for peace with the Balkan states of Romania and Britain politicians, diplomats and civil society towards preserving peaceful relations in the period of operation of the Paris Peace Conference. The most radical departure from the principle of national self-determination which practiced Foreign-Office came in relation to Romania’s frontier with Bulgaria. The tasks are to characterize the content of the work of the Romanian diplomatic commission in the direction of the defending the rights to South Dobrudja and the determination of the position of Great Britain as for territorial independence of the region. The main thesis of the article is that after First World War Romania sought to large an alliance with t least on of the Great Powers in case of an attack on South Dobrudja, in this sense, Romania’s diplomatic success was only partial. The Romanian government realized that only the permission of the Great Powers, such as Great Britain, would strength its presence in the region. The Great Britain treated ambiguously towards such aspirations of Romania. For the first, Foreign Office was not forgotten for Bucharest the separate peace with the Central Powers in 1918. For the second, Britain diplomatic and military mission at Southern Dobrudja did not take the politics of the terror of Romanian in Bessarabia. The Great Britain provided a summary of the position in Southern Dobrudja: provisional British military occupation is the only possible solution for the moment, in spite of the unrest this causes to the Rumanian Government. From the first of the being in Paris, the Romanian diplomats were sounded actively the question how the Great Britain and France would see the future status of Southern Dobrudja. The Romanian demand for Southern Dobrudja was strongly citing national self-determination and protecting peace in Balkan. Most in the British delegation hoped that this could be agreed. However, the British and French refused absolutely to compel an ally to surrender territory to an enemy. The decision, British politics believed, lay with Romania: such readjustment could only be made after friendly conversations with the Rumanian Government. It is important that the Rumanian politics themselves should be a consenting party to the cession of Southern Dobrudja and that Romanians should not be left with the feeling that they have been robbed by their Allies to placate their enemies. In the Parice Peace Conference Foreign Office took the legalistic view that, because Southern Dobrudja was secured by Romania before the war, its future was beyond the remit of the Peace Conference. The Britain Commission stated in its projects that it was not authorized to recommend a modification of the frontier which would involve the cession to an enemy State of a territory forming de facto et de jure an integral part of an Allied State. The Romanians, angry about losing part of the Banat, never offered to give up Southern Dobrudja. The Americans pushed their view in the Council of Heads of Delegations between July and November, but the British were unyielding. The issue was not even mentioned in the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria in November. Thus, in the words of a member of the Bulgarian Delegation, the settlement proclaimed the principle that no land can be claimed from the victors. It has been argued here that Bucharest gained territory not because of the wartime treaty that promised her so much, and not because of the dubious diplomatic skills of Romanian delegation, but because the Roma nians had a strong case and it was effectively presented by Romanophiles like Britain delegation. There was one other reason, however, that tended to shine its harsh light on every issue, the simple idea that these people are our friends and those are our enemies. This was stated most starkly and frequently by the French, but it was also evident in the British unwillingness to coerce the Romanians over Southern Dobrudja. The consequence of making a settlement which dealt severely with losers was that they became revisionist and eventually allied themselves with those who would undo the hated treaties. Romania remains much bigger than she was in 1918, but the settlement that created Greater Romania did not survive the vengeance of its enemies.
Опис
Ключові слова
добруджанське питання, Румунія, Болгарія, Велика Британія, Паризька мирна конференція, Dobrudja question, Romania, Bulgaria, the Great Britain, the Paris Peace Conference
Бібліографічний опис
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