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Документ Nuclear security in international conflict zones(2024) Kurando, Mariia S.; Курандо, Марія СергіївнаMariia Kurando. “Nuclear Security in International Conflict Zones.” – Manuscript. The thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy degree on specialty 052 – Political Science. – Odesa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, Odesa, 2024. The thesis is devoted to the study of nuclear security in international conflict zones, more specifically, to the question of the protection of nuclear installations during armed conflicts. In recent years, this topic has gained significant attention due to the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) by Russian military forces. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked debates on the insufficiency of the international legal framework on the protection of nuclear installations during war. Despite the existing provisions of international humanitarian law (IHL), the international community has been unable to compel Russia to withdraw its forces from the ZNPP and end hostilities. The war on Ukraine and the Zaporizhzhia crisis revealed challenges and shortcomings not only in the provisions of the IHL but also in the nuclear security regime itself. One of the greatest challenges the regime faces is that it has not been designed to counter threats posed by the state actors. The concept of nuclear security has constantly evolved to answer emerging threats. Starting from association with the physical security of nuclear materials, its most recent interpretation has been based on the prevention, detection, and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other misconduct involving nuclear materials, other radioactive substances, or their associated facilities. Predominantly associated with the actions of terrorist groups, the nuclear security procedures were aimed at combating threats from non-state actors. Thus, the instance of the state army posing a threat to nuclear facilities, although being hypothetically considered, did not receive its fair share of attention. The question of the further evolution of the concept remains open. Protecting nuclear facilities at wartimes also turned out to be uneasy for the international community. Ukrainian ZNPP remains occupied and in the middle of military operations. Many experts offered different approaches to resolve the crisis. While some were advocating for the development and implementation of a new, more profound regime on nuclear facilities’ protection, others were hesitant to violate the established order. For the Ukrainian case, the example of India and Pakistan has been multiply cited, specifically the existing between the two nations Agreement on Prohibition of Attacks on Nuclear Installations and Facilities signed in 1988. However, there has been no explanation of how and whether it could work in Ukraine. Moreover, the shortcomings of this agreement have been rarely analysed. The necessity to examine the chances of practical implementation of this bilateral endeavour in Ukraine’s post-war scenario explains the scientific novelty of the research. The analysis is based on a thorough study of India and Pakistan’s rivalry, which explains the motivations for such a paradox of cooperation. Moreover, the research explains why bilateral cooperation is a better alternative to the failing multilateral. For domestic political science, the work is one of the first attempts to research the possibilities of Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia crisis resolution and to initiate the strengthening of international practices to prevent and deal with instances like the one happening in Ukraine. In this thesis: For the first time: - The conceptual development of nuclear security as a practical tool has been reviewed in the framework of the international liberal order and institutional development of the NPT regime; - The nuclear security concept was applied regarding one of the most acute challenges – Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian nuclear installations – to Ukraine and international security in general; - The sufficiency of the international legal framework, including the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Seven Indispensable Pillars and Five Concrete Principles on the protection of nuclear installations in wartime, has been critically examined; - The application of the international case study experience as a tool for increasing the efficiency of crisis mitigation and nuclear security management has been scrutinized; - The main challenges for the multinational cooperation on the protection of nuclear installations during wartime and implications for the resolution of the Ukrainian nuclear security case have been identified; Improved: - Study of the peculiarities of state cooperation within a liberal international order with regard to the nuclear security regime; - Description of the challenges of multilateral cooperation in correspondence with liberal international order crisis; - Assessment of the “necessary” vs. “possible” measures to improve nuclear security; Further development took place: - Definitions of “nuclear safety” and “nuclear security concept” based on the study of works of modern Ukrainian and foreign scholars; - The impact of states’ national interests on their willingness to develop transparent cooperation in the nuclear security field on multilateral and bilateral levels. - A set of practical recommendations for mitigation of the Ukrainian nuclear security crisis with regard to the management of future cases similar to the one unfolding in Ukraine. In the course of the study, the author revealed that the international legal framework is not sufficient enough to effectively protect nuclear installations in wartime and adequately prevent instances akin to the Ukrainian one from happening. The lacuna in the existing regimes can be explained by several factors: the insufficiency of response to the attacks that have happened in the past, the inability of the international community to find common ground on the crucial for the protection regime issues, the overall failure of the multilateral efforts, as well as the gradual decay of the international liberal order. The measures undertaken in Ukraine draw a line between what is needed and what can be done, with international efforts achieving a certain result, but nevertheless being insufficient. The history of developing nuclear facility protection regimes also indicates an upsetting conclusion — international cooperation fails. The alternative path for Ukraine and other countries located in conflict-prone areas, i.e., bilateral cooperation, show more promising considerations. Thus, if all the shortcomings present in the 1988 Agreement on Prohibition of Attacks on Nuclear Installations and Facilities are avoided, India and Pakistan’s case could serve as a valuable example for the future of post-war Russia-Ukraine relations and the resolution of the Zaporizhzhia crisis. It is fair to state that no bilateral or regional instruments can prevent attacks on nuclear facilities; however, the experience suggests that international humanitarian law cannot do it either. The number of nuclear-generating countries that are located in conflict-prone zones that are likely to remain tense for years ahead adds value to adequate national nuclear security threat assessment and mutual peace-preserving actions to prevent and explicitly prohibit attacks on the nuclear installations.