

УДК 351.741.1

*Znamenok M. V.*

## **MILITARY DOCTRINES OF UKRAINE 1993, 2004, 2015, 2021: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

*The Military Doctrine of Ukraine is an essential component of its national security policy, which aims to ensure the timely identification, prevention, and neutralization of threats to Ukraine's national interests. It is precisely for this reason the need to have a firm understanding of this document is dire. The purpose of this article is to analyze the scale and quality of changes introduced to the Military Doctrines of Ukraine over decades, and the underlying reasons for the specific differences. In order to do so, the text of four mentioned doctrines was analyzed with the aim of spotting the changes in language and priorities in said documents, which could reflect a response to new or emerging, as for their respective times, threats. Substantive shifts in their understanding of concepts, such as security and the methods suggested for its provision was also looked for.*

*The article finds that the doctrine as a document has undergone significant changes, particularly after the events of 2014, when Russian Federation occupied parts of Ukrainian territory. The evolution underwent by the document in the span of 1993-2021 can be generally described as a process of its actualization, concretization and merger of theory with practicality.*

**Keywords:** *Military Doctrine of Ukraine, National Security Strategy, Russian aggression, threat perception, comparative analysis.*

**Statement of the problem.** Given the dramatic increase of the military aspect in the overall scope of Ukrainian security provision, brought about by an abrupt full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022,

there exists a need to better understand the main documents of Ukraine concerning this topic.

Moreover, the evolution of Ukraine's Military Doctrines in response to changes in the country's security environment remains insufficiently covered in academic research. This article seeks to address this problem by conducting a comparative analysis of the 1993, 2004, 2015 and 2021 Military Doctrines, in order to identify key differences in their approaches to capability building, strategy, tactics and threat perception. Moreover, the analysis will evaluate the extent to which these changes reflect shifts in Ukraine's overall security posture, particularly in light of hybrid and direct Russian aggression.

In doing so, this article seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of Ukraine's strategic thinking and defense capabilities in the face of evolving security threats.

**Analysis of sources, relevant research and publications.** In the process of writing this work, a number of sources were used to cover various aspects of the topic under study. In this article, sources fall into two main categories - primary and secondary. Primary sources used in the process of comparative analysis included Verkhovna Rada resolutions of 1991 on the establishment of Ukrainian Armed Forces and National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine [1], of 1993 on the Military Doctrine of Ukraine [2], as well as Presidential decrees of 2004 [3], 2015 [4] and 2021 [5]. In addition, an interview with Oleh Melikhov, Director of the Department of Military Policy and Strategic Planning of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry [11] was used to acquire the most accurate and up to date official Ukrainian posture on the matter.

Secondary sources, on the other hand, included academic works, mainly articles, of such Ukrainian authors as Furashev (2011) [13]; Pogibko (2015) [8]; Sokurenko (2016) [9]; Kormich (2017) [7]; Smolyanyuk (2021) [10].

Anthill [12] dedicated a part of his 2021 report to uncovering the role of Military Doctrines in the development of Territorial defense system in Ukraine. Горник & Євмешкіна [6] in their 2023 article on Ukrainian Military policy as a component of broader Defense policy briefly touch upon the topic of Military Doctrine within that framework. Furashev, Kormich and Smolyanyuk came closest to providing comparative analysis of the Doctrines in their respective works, and yet their articles either contained it partially, or were limited by the chronological reality of their time. In other words, the research of said authors was limited by the lack of context brought by the newest Doctrine iterations and the full-scale russian invasion in 2022, which we have today.

**The purpose of this article** is to analyze the text of four aforementioned doctrines in order to spot the changes in language and priorities, which could reflect a response to newly established or emerging threats, as for their respective times. The article will also look for substantive shifts in understanding of concepts present in the documents, such as of security, and of the methods suggested for its provision.

**Presentation of the main material.** According to Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine", the President of Ukraine develops and approves the National Security Strategy of Ukraine and the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, in order to timely identify, prevent and neutralize real and potential threats to the national interests of Ukraine. The National Security Strategy of Ukraine and the Military Doctrine of Ukraine are binding documents and the basis for the development of specific programs on the components of the state national security policy.

Even though one of the first legal decisions of Ukraine on the topic of defense that saw life on October 11, 1991 through the hands of Verkhovna Rada, was the Concept of defense and construction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and creation of the Defense Council

of Ukraine [1], the Military Doctrine of 1993 followed soon and became a comprehensive collection of Ukrainian position on the topic of war and peace, with regards to both external and internal aspects of it.

The Military Doctrine of Ukraine can be defined in general terms as a part of the general national security concept, a set of fundamental guidelines and principles for organizing and ensuring the security of the individual, people and state through political, diplomatic, economic and military measures. It determines the state policy of Ukraine in the military sphere [2, 3, 4, 5].

It is necessary to mention that the latter two Military Doctrines have been subsidiary to National Security Strategies of Ukraine, first introduced in 2007, and then updated in 2015 and 2020 [6]. Prior to this, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine as a document had been self-contained, and hence – primary in Ukraine's understanding of defense and security, on par with the Constitution and laws on defense and security, which are at the same time much less flexible. This rigidity allows them to constitute more of a fundamental legal acquis, and yet because of it they cannot come into comparison with the Military Doctrines in terms of being a playground for innovative thought.

Simultaneously, we have to understand the difference between said Strategies and Doctrines. In general, it consists of the fact that a Strategy is the basis for planning the activities of state authorities in the field of national security, whereas a Doctrine is the outlook the state has on security and risks to it. In addition, to rid ourselves of misunderstanding, we have to note that the 2021 version of the Military Doctrine is called Military Security Strategy of Ukraine, despite being the same in essence. However, in a sense, this shift in naming also reflects how the state tried to combine the features of both types of documents in one vial. Not a surprising move, considering that their functions are not contradictory in the first place and can be easily combined.

General approaches to the comparative analysis of the researched issue also constitute the presence of a significant shift that was rooted in the events of 2014.

For instance, according to СМОЛЯНЮК [10], the process of ensuring national security of Ukraine can be divided into 2 stages, first being the 1991-2014 (imitational) and the second – after 2014 (substantive). The researcher argues that during the first stage there was widespread use of Soviet approaches to the formation of the institutional framework, as well as imitation of the defense activity of armed formations, and the development of the Military Organization in general.

And although the reality of 1993–2015 period of Doctrinal really was imitational, it is still worth to mention that there were efforts made to counteract it. For example, the version of 2004, in its original and subsequent editions, amended in 2005 and 2009, laid the emphasis on pursuing a policy of Euro-Atlantic integration, with the ultimate goal of joining NATO as the basis of the pan-European security system, as well as deepening relations with the EU, in preparation for the long journey of becoming its member [13].

The political reality of the new presidency ended these efforts [13], as the radically new version of the Military Doctrine was approved by the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and by the Presidential Decree No. 390/2012 of June 8, 2012. In it, the direction of Euro-Atlantic integration has been blocked, and Ukraine's preparation for full membership in the EU became out of the question. It is repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine adheres to the policy of non-alignment. This new version of the original 2004 Doctrine had been in force for 3 years, up to the autumn of 2015.

In early 2014, that imitational system collapsed, as it failed to counteract Russia's aggressive plans. In an effort to repress the will of the Ukrainian people for a European future, Russia occupied part of Ukraine's territory [9].

The beginning of the subsequent essential stage led to Ukraine reimagining its national

security system, while also placing the emphasis on proactive involvement of civil society in the implementation of security and defense tasks – e.g. the organization of volunteer battalions and local self-defense forces; aiding the already powerful volunteer movement; trying to channel the strong will to resist the propaganda attacks of Russian federation into governmental action; implementing patriotic values in the spiritual and cultural life of the population, as well as others.

Civil society's response to the challenges and dangers that threaten the very existence of an independent and sovereign Ukraine has thus made changes in the national approach to defense inevitable. And indeed, after 2014 there has been a fundamental shift in the understanding of national security. Previously declarative claim that the protection of national interests is the main priority, in times of the substantive system started to come into life, as the stifled bureaucracy of the state became more diluted with passionate people whose position was tied to personal values, rather than the personal convenience of holding a governmental position.

General overview aside, in order to conduct thorough comparative analysis, we can take the Military Doctrine of 1993 as a basis, from which we will build upon in chronological order. This method will allow us to better align the changes in the doctrine with changes in political and security context, to see if they truly coincide. In addition, any direct references inside their texts to the events of their corresponding times will also constitute the argument in favor of the hypothesis. These criteria will be used to test the veracity of this essay hypothesis.

The first Doctrine begins by presenting the general doctrinal position present in all subsequent versions: when it comes to international conflict and disputes, Ukraine relies heavily on the provisions of the international law. In addition, Ukraine does not recognize war as a means of solving

international problems, does not have any territorial claims to any state and does not see any nation as an enemy. Together with this, Ukraine claims that it will never be the first to start hostilities against any country unless it becomes the target of aggression and in the event of a military threat will be forced to give an adequate response to any armed aggression, no matter where it comes from [2].

All of these statements encompass into a standard position that even authoritarian states claim to uphold. Hence, let us proceed in our analysis to find more substantive features.

One of such is Ukraine participates in the reduction of troops and conventional weapons (part 1.2 titled “Causes of military danger. Ukraine's attitude to the war”) [2]. The other is that Ukraine builds its relations with other states regardless of their socio-political system and military-political orientation on mutual consideration of all issues of national security of the parties, prohibits the use of its own Armed Forces to resolve internal political issues on its territory, as well as adheres to the status of a non-aligned state (part 1.1. titled “Military and political goals of Ukraine and international priorities in the field of national security”).

Another peculiarity, also noted by Kormich [7], is the fact that a significant part of it was dedicated to the topic of nuclear weapons, where Ukraine proclaimed its desire for nuclear disarmament and other generally good aspirations in the spirit of international law. In addition, the provision titled “The basic principles of building the Armed Forces” states that Ukraine desires to move into the direction of operating a contract-based professional army, instead of conscription one. This particular statement has remained an empty populist promise for years on. In addition, Ukraine proclaims their desire and ambitions to partake in peace-building world-wide, as well as be a powerful country in terms of military technology development (part 3.1. “Purpose and principles of military-economic policy”).

The closest thing to a mention of the security threat, however, in this quite a “blanket

document” is the statement that Ukraine will consider its potential enemy a state “whose consistent policy poses a military threat to Ukraine, leads to interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine, encroachment on its territorial integrity and national interests”.

In all of the other aspects the 1993 Doctrine sets out regulatory provisions on the structure and functions of the already existing defense institutions.

As for the doctrine of 2004 – it first introduced a list of relevant definitions, which was a step in the right direction, as it lessened the ambiguity and decreased the chances for misinterpretation.

Another feature that appears for the first time in this version is the description of the military and political situation at the time, as well as the characteristics of modern military conflicts. It mentions that the shifting nature of the military-political situation in the world and points out the influence of the following trends:

- formation of a system of multipolar relations;
- growing disagreements between the leading centers of power;
- growth of mutual dependence in the context of globalization, increasing influence of international corporations, aggravation of the struggle for natural resources, use of the energy factor to achieve political goals;
- reduced efficiency of international organizations in conflict resolution;
- desire of some states to achieve the production of nuclear weapons;
- preservation of the role of military force;
- increasing danger of dual-use technologies;
- the spread of terrorism (including cyberterrorism), piracy, organized crime, illegal migration, illegal arms and drug trafficking, and human trafficking;
- increasing capacity of states to conduct information-psychological operations;
- global climate change, reduction in natural resources, growing shortages of drinking

water and food, and intensification of migration processes in the world.

It is worth to say that all of the trends are mentioned accurately and even coincide with the issues of today's world. The same is to say for also mentioned:

1) Internal conditions that limit Ukraine's ability to resolve problematic issues, such as corruption, economic instability, incompleteness of systemic reforms.

2) Problematic issues of military-political relations, such as: 1. Unresolved or possibly new regional conflicts, 2. Incomplete legalization of the state border, 3. Manifestations of separatism by national minorities, 4. Low living standards, 5. Hostile national and ethnic policies of neighboring states, 6. Interference in the internal affairs to aggravate socio-political, interfaith and interethnic relations, 7. Creation of paramilitary or armed groups not sanctioned by law, 8. Increased competition for access to raw materials and control over the routes of their delivery to the markets, 9. Use of economy to achieve political goals.

The doctrine mentions that these challenges may lead to military and political risks, including aggravation of Ukraine's national interests, and the threat of military force against it.

3) List of actions, which Ukraine considers to indicate an increasing level of threat of the use of military force, which include

1. Territorial claims, 2. Calls for or attempts to revise existing state borders, 3. Buildup of troops and ammunition near the borders, expansion and modernization of existing military bases and facilities, 4. Creation or purchase of new, or modernization of existing military equipment of an offensive nature, 5. Intensification of intelligence activities, 6. Information and psychological measures to destabilize the socio-political situation, interethnic and interfaith relations in Ukraine or its individual regions and places of compact residence of national minorities, 7. Political and economic sanctions against Ukraine, 8. Use of military force in the region,

9. Support for separatism, 10. Justification of the use of military force as a tool of conflict resolution, 11. Weakening of legislative restrictions on the use of military force outside of one's own territory, 12. Violation of international agreements and treaties, especially those regarding the military sphere, 13. Stimulation of the regional conflicts to escalate them.

4) Features of modern armed conflicts, such as increased role of non-traditionally military measures, like economy or information, increased role of coalitions, influence of the local and international public opinion on the course of war, increased use of new types of weapons, increased depth and breadth of the range of new weapons, ability for simultaneous attacks on multiple directions.

In addition, the 2004 Military Doctrine sets out principles to follow in order to avoid conflict or its escalation, which also was not mentioned in the previous version. On top of that, in paragraph 19, Ukraine elaborates on the intentions or actions of other states which facilitate the outbreak of a military conflict against it [3], namely:

- Putting forward ultimatum demands, which may lead to violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine;
- Termination of diplomatic relations with Ukraine;
- Allowing another state to use its territory by a third state (coalition) to prepare and carry out aggression against Ukraine;
- Economic or information blockade of Ukraine;
- Making it impossible for national security entities to perform their functions;
- Conducting actions that violate the safety of the functioning of critical infrastructure, including nuclear facilities, as well as cyber-attacks on them;
- Demonstration of military force, intensification of subversive activities against Ukraine;

- financing of paramilitary or armed groups on the territory of Ukraine not sanctioned by its law or supplying them with any kind of military equipment;
- Deployment of military formations near the state border of Ukraine;
- Leaving the agreed upon points of deployment for armed units of another state, as well as actions to use such units against a third state.

In general, we can observe a substantive evolution of the Military Doctrine format in Ukraine, which however focused mainly on theoretical questions, and left no changes in the practical realm.

As for the changes seen in the 2015 version [4], we can highlight the following.

It begins by saying that the aggression of Russian Federation have led to the destruction of the global and regional security systems and of the principles of international law, which necessitated a review and clarification of the doctrinal provisions on the formation and implementation of Ukraine's military policy. (The use of word “destroy” is a bit overpowering the message, but it says clear nevertheless. We get to know the reason for the creation of a new Military Doctrine.)

The scope of relevant definitions nearly doubled in size, and started to include not only definitions regarding war or aggression, but also of state defense structures and bodies.

The security environment is described there practically in the same way, with the exception of increase in military spending being mentioned as an additional factor.

Previously mentioned point of “growing disagreements between the leading centers of power” is supplemented with the phrase “in particular, the escalation of the confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation”.

There are mentions of such pressing issues of international relations as the aggravation of the security situation in the Middle East and North Africa, the intensification of religious extremism and the spread of radical Islam in Central Asia, and

disagreements between Asia-Pacific states over the ownership of island zones. All of these, together with 35 direct mentions of Russian Federation with regards to its influence on Ukrainian security reality, show us that there happened a shift from simply theoretical approach to the binding of that theory to real world cases.

New reality of occupation and direct-armed confrontation have reshaped the Doctrine to include provisions on dealing with these new challenges. Nevertheless, the structure of the Doctrine resembles that of the 2004 version. We can even go as far as to say that the 2015 version was created by substantively amending the previous one, and not by starting from scratch. It can be seen in almost direct transfers of wording in provisions.

The concrete changes described here are only indications of the large-scale shift underwent by the Military Doctrine in 2015 and 2014, when it was in the stages of its development. In general, the major signifier of 2015 Doctrine was, as described above, a change in mindsets and in the societal context of state-public relations. It was a life-saving change for Ukraine, since, in words of Порицько [8], “...the history of our state establishment shows that Ukraine had lost its statehood every time it began to neglect its defense interests.”

As for the 2021 version, we can include it in our analysis on the basis that with its implementation, all previous versions became invalid. Thus, despite the difference in its name, this document still can be considered in the same league as all of the previous ones.

The 2021 Strategy of military security is subtitled “Military security is a comprehensive defense”. Indeed, comprehensive defense is a term that was introduced for the first time in this version. Said comprehensiveness was described by Oleh Melikhov, Director of the Department of Military Policy and Strategic Planning of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in his interview for Army Inform [11]. In his words,

it lies in the fact that Ukraine transfers its defense into all three realms – air, land, sea and cyberspace, as well as uses all means to defend itself – from state to civil ones, including in cultural and diplomatic fields. Ukraine also reserves a right to use asymmetric means to repel an attack, as long as it complies with international law.

In the latest Doctrine, Ukraine considers the best scenario to be maintaining a certain balance and synergy of military and non-military means to ensure the military security of Ukraine instead of achieving military parity with the Russian Federation, which would lead to excessive militarization of the state and, accordingly, depletion of the national economy [5].

Additional unprecedented feature of this version is that it was the first document of this kind to introduce planning of any kind. The Strategy sets out seven goals, or rather expected results, achievement of which would mean the success of the state policy in the military sphere, defense and military construction. 1) Containment of Russian aggression within manageable limits with available national and international means; 2) Practical development of the territorial defense system; 3) Civil control of the defense system, and other practices of the Euro-Atlantic standards; 4) Optimization of human resources application, increase in professionalism; 5) Improved quality of military equipment; 6) Improved military infrastructure; 7) Alignment of the armed forces with all of the necessary criteria of NATO compatibility.

The Strategy also mentions the foundations of the comprehensive defense. They include Deterrence, Resilience and Interaction.

As for the long or mid-term planning, it sets out four stages: 1) capacity planning; 2) programming (program document development); 3) budgeting 4) implementation. This attribute also distinguishes this version among others [11].

However, having the context of 2022-2023 in mind, we should pay more attention to

the role of Territorial defense, which saw a life in terms of systematic preparations only after it appeared in the mentioned document in 2021. Антон Муравейник [12] in his report provides us with information that the Territorial defense had existed formally ever since 1991, when it first appeared in the Law of Ukraine “On the defense of Ukraine”. However, he argues, it existed only on paper up until 2014, when this concept had been pulled out of the drawer to accommodate for the unprecedented phenomenon of volunteer army forming from the ground up. Then, it had not been properly institutionalized and funded up until 2021.

Knowing this, we can say that the appearance of this document could not have been timelier. It also brought much needed change in terms of tying already theory to practicality, as well as updating what was needed.

**Conclusions.** Having conducted all of the necessary analysis, we can safely argue that there has been extensive evolution of Ukraine's national security strategy and military doctrine over time.

It can be seen in the fact that the first version of the Military Doctrine, introduced in 1993 and focused primarily on declaring the general position of Ukraine on both external and internal aspects of war and use of armed forces, was substituted in 2004 by a qualitatively new version, which introduced such novel sections, as definitions and description of military and political situation at the time. The 1993 Military Doctrine, unlike the further versions, had also been keen on elaborating Ukrainian posture on nuclear and conventional arms disarmament, as well as on the status of Ukraine as a militarily non-aligned state. It has also expressed ambitious and unfulfilled claims of Ukraine to become an invaluable regional and global actor in peace-building efforts, as well as in military technology development. At the same time, the subsequent 2004 version strived to actualize purely theoretical nature of the previous doctrine by highlighting real-

world examples of regional and global security threats. It also acknowledged the changing nature of international relations and paid attention to such issues as separatism and even hybrid warfare in the form of information operations. In addition, it outlined actions of foreign actors which if conducted would indicate an increasing level of military threat.

The 2015 version of the doctrine was created as, in addition to being shaped by, a national response to Russian aggression as well as concurrent destabilization of global and regional security systems. It expanded the scope of definitions and acknowledged the Russian aggression and the resulting armed conflict as the main security challenges to Ukraine. It emphasized the need to counter hybrid warfare tactics, including the use of irregular armed groups, disinformation, and cyber-attacks. The doctrine also addressed the issue of separatism and the protection of Ukraine's territorial integrity. The changes present there reflected the general shift in the understanding of national security in Ukraine after 2014, emphasizing the active involvement of civil society in defense tasks and the reimagining of the national security system.

The latest as of now, 2021 version differentiated in the fact that it introduced the concept of comprehensive defense, as well as emphasized the use of all available means, to protect the country. The strategy aimed to maintain a balance between military and non-military approaches and discarded military parity with Russia as its goal. It outlined seven goals for success, including containing Russian aggression, developing territorial defense, implementing civil control, optimizing resources, improving equipment and infrastructure, and aligning the military with NATO standards. A key aspect of the strategy was the introduction of planning stages, as it marked a significant departure from previous documents. The strategy also emphasized the importance of territorial defense, which had existed on paper since 1991 but only gained systematic preparations and funding in 2021. It also proclaimed the right for the use of

asymmetric means within international law to repel attacks on the country.

Overall, the assumption of Ukrainian Military Doctrines being highly reactive to the country's experience of aggression in all of its forms can be confirmed by the findings. While comparing the documents' text, we were able to see that qualitative changes have made Ukrainian Military Doctrines less general and more specific to the circumstances of their respective times.

#### References:

1. The Verkhovna Rada adopted the Concept of Defense and Construction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and established the Defense Council of Ukraine. Archive of the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine. 1991. [Верховна Рада ухвалила Концепцію оборони та будівництва Збройних сил України і створила Раду оборони України. Архів Національної бібліотеки України ім. В. І. Вернадського. 1991]. URL: <http://www.nbuv.gov.ua/node/4344> (дата звернення: 12.04.23)
2. Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Military Doctrine of Ukraine. 1993. [Постанова Верховної Ради України про Воєнну доктрину України. 1993]. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=3529-12#Text> (дата звернення: 12.04.23)
3. Decree of the President of Ukraine on the Military Doctrine of Ukraine. 2004. [Указ Президента України про Воєнну доктрину України]. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=648%2F2004#Text> (дата звернення: 12.04.23)
4. Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 555/2015 on the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of September 2, 2015 "On the New Edition of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine". [Указ Президента України

- №555/2015 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 2 вересня 2015 року "Про нову редакцію Воєнної доктрини України"]. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5552015-19443> (дата звернення: 12.04.23)
5. Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 121/2021 on the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of March 25, 2021 "On the Military Security Strategy of Ukraine". [Указ Президента України №121/2021 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 25 березня 2021 року «Про Стратегію воєнної безпеки України»]. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1212021-37661> (дата звернення: 12.04.23)
6. Gornyk V. G., Yevmeshkina O. L. Peculiarities of Formation and Implementation of Military Policy as a Component of Defense Policy of Ukraine. *Scientific notes of Vernadsky TNU. Series: Public management and administration*. 2023. [Горник В. Г., Євмешкіна О. Л. Особливості формування та реалізації воєнної політики як складової оборонної політики України. *Вчені записки ТНУ імені В.І. Вернадського. Серія: Публічне управління та адміністрування*. 2023. Том 34 (73). № 1] URL: <http://www.pubadm.vernadskyjournals.in.ua/34-73-1> (дата звернення: 06.04.2023)
7. Kormych L. I. Determinants of the Military Strategy of Independent Ukraine. *Actual problems of politics*. 2017. Is. 59. P. 17–34. [Кормич Л. І., Детермінанти Воєнної Стратегії незалежної України. *Актуальні проблеми політики*. 2017. Вип. 59. С. 17–34].
8. Pohibko O. Military Doctrine of Ukraine – the legal basis for legislative support of state defense. *Prykarpattya Law Journal*. 2015. Is. 39. P. 5–18. [Погібко О. І. Воєнна Доктрина України – нормативно-правове підґрунтя законодавчого забезпечення оборони держави. *Прикарпатський юридичний вісник*. Вип. 39, 2015. С. 5–18.].
9. Sokurenko V. New Military Doctrine of Ukraine as a basis for reforming the national security and defense sector. *Modern problems of legal, economic and social development of the state*. Kharkiv, 2016. P. 34–56. [Сокурєнко В. Нова Воєнна доктрина України як основа реформування національного сектору безпеки і оборони. *Сучасні проблеми правового, економічного та соціального розвитку*. Харків, 2016. С. 34–56].
10. Smolyaniuk V. National security of independent Ukraine: comprehending the essence. *Political Studies*. №1. 2021. [Смолянчук В. Національна безпека незалежної України: осягнення сутності. *Політичні дослідження*. №1. 2021]. URL: [https://ipiend.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/smolianiuk\\_nationalna.pdf](https://ipiend.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/smolianiuk_nationalna.pdf) (дата звернення: 06.04.2023)
11. Ukraine's Military Security Strategy: Goals, Principles, Aspects. Interview with Oleh Melikhov, Director of the Department of Military Policy and Strategic Planning of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. *Army Inform*. 2021. [Стратегія воєнної безпеки України: цілі, принципи, аспекти. Інтерв'ю з директором Департаменту воєнної політики та стратегічного планування Міністерства оборони України Олегом Меліховим. *Армія Inform*. 2021]. URL: <https://armyinform.com.ua/2021/05/01/strategiya-voennoyi-bezpeky-ukrayiny-czili-prynczury-aspekty/> (дата звернення: 06.04.2023)
12. Muraveinyk A. Territorial defense of Ukraine. History, current state and future. Research of the analytical department of the NGO "Come Back Alive" in cooperation with the Embassy of Sweden

in Ukraine and the International Renaissance Foundation. 2021 [Муравейник А. Територіальна оборона України. *Історія, сучасний стан та майбутнє*. 2021].

URL: <https://savelife.in.ua/materials/research/terytorialna-oborona-ukrainy-istoriya-su/>.(дата звернення: 06.04.2023)

13. Furashov V. Draft of the new Military Doctrine of Ukraine: a guide to action or a declaration? *Viche*. 2011. P. 12–25 [Фурашев В. Проект нової Воєнної доктрини України: керівництво до дії чи декларація? *Віче*. 2011. С. 12–25].

**Знаменок М. В.** – студентка 1 курсу магістратури факультету Міжнародних відносин, політології та соціології Одеського національного університету імені І. І. Мечникова.

### **ВОЄННІ ДОКТРИНИ УКРАЇНИ 1993, 2004, 2015, 2021 РОКІВ: ПОРІВНЯЛЬНИЙ АНАЛІЗ**

*Воєнна доктрина України є невід'ємною складовою політики національної безпеки, яка покликана забезпечити своєчасне виявлення, запобігання і нейтралізацію загроз національним інтересам України. Саме тому потреба у чіткому розумінні цього документу є вкрай актуальною. Метою цієї статті є аналіз масштабу та якості змін, внесених до Воєнних доктрин України протягом десятиліть, а також глибинних причин конкретних відмінностей між ними. Для досягнення цього було проаналізовано тексти чотирьох згаданих доктрин з метою виявлення змін у формулюваннях і пріоритетах у зазначених документах, які могли відобразити реакцію на нові або нові, як на той час, загрози. Було також здійснено пошук суттєвих зрушень у розумінні таких понять, як безпека та методи, що пропонуються для її забезпечення.*

*У статті показано, що доктрина як документ зазнала значних змін, особливо після подій 2014 року, коли російська Федерація окупувала частину території України. Еволюцію, якої зазнав документ у 1993-2021 роках, загалом можна охарактеризувати як процес його актуалізації, конкретизації та злиття теорії з практикою.*

**Ключові слова:** *Воєнна доктрина України, Стратегія національної безпеки, російська агресія, розпізнавання загроз, порівняльний аналіз.*

*Рекомендовано до друку –  
к. політ. н., доцент Максименко І. В.*

*Стаття надійшла 24.04.2023*