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|Title:||The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Worldview: Policy Implications|
|Authors:||Sinovets, Polina A.|
|Citation:||Norwegian Institute for Safety and Security. Occasional Paper Series.|
|Abstract:||Nuclear weapons occupy a special place in the policy of Russia. Today it is even possible to say that they have become a part of Russian strategic culture, initially built around the idea of a strong military state. It is difficult not to agree with Fritz Ermarth, who said that during the whole history of the Russian Empire military power became the “chief institutional foundation of Russian statehood”.1 Even the abdication of Tsar Nicolas II from the throne in 1917 was accepted by the General Staff, instead of by the State Duma, as it should have been.2 The same culture was continued by the USSR. Having become a superpower following the victory over Germany in 1945, 5 million Soviet troops were deployed across the territories of Eastern Europe, ready to grasp the whole continent upon the General Secretary’s command.After the breakup of the Soviet Union, which saw a weakening in the field of conventional weapons, Russia still continued to occupy the position of the second world’s nuclear superpower. This criteria of the great state – the only remaining since the time of the Cold War – has become one of the greatest incentives to revive Russian state nationalism, which together with revanchist ideas form the political portrait of Moscow today. The aim of the article is to analyze the connections between the Russian nuclear worldview and Russian state policy during the twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War.|
|Other Identifiers:||doi: 10.17265/2159-5313/2016.07.002|
|Appears in Collections:||Статті та доповіді ФМВПС|
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