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|Title:||International Consequences of Russian-Ukrainian Conflict|
|Authors:||Brusylovska, Olha I.|
|Citation:||Research and Development on Social Sciences . – International Association of Social Science Research, 2017.|
|Series/Report no.:||;№ 13.|
|Abstract:||All polls showed that a majority of people in Russia could not accept the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine. Russians generally say they have a more negative attitude towards Ukraine than vice versa. Polls in Russia have shown that after top Russian officials made radical statements or took drastic actions against Ukraine the attitude of those polled towards Ukraine worsened every time (Popescu & Wilson, 2009). The issues that have hurt Russians' view of Ukraine are: Possible Ukrainian NATO membership; Ukrainian attempts to have the Holodomor recognized as genocide against the Ukrainian nation; Attempts to honour the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Russian governments always tried to use these perceptions like instrument in their foreign policy. The turning point came with the Orange revolution in 2004, when Russia’s clumsy tactics of interference in support for Viktor Yanukovych backfired, triggering a serious Russian tactical rethink. Drawing its lessons from the central role played by civil society groups and NGOs in the Orange revolution, Russia began developing a rival “counter-revolutionary” ideology, supporting “its” NGOs, using “its” web technologies, and exporting its own brands of political and economic influence. Gleb Pavlovskii describes the Orange revolution as “a very useful catastrophe for Russia. We learnt a lot” (Popescu & Wilson, 2009).|
|Appears in Collections:||Статті та доповіді ФМВПС|
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