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THE IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION
OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AFTER 2004

ABSTRACT

The article explains the role of nationalism and liberalism in the modern ideological transformation of the post-communist countries in the South-Eastern Europe. The author emphasizes that the processes of globalization and European integration didn't prevent a strengthening of the nationalist parties. The reasons of increasing of nationalist wave are traditional: value orientations, unsolved economic and demographical problems, crises of trust to political elites. The potential for political control depended primarily on the national identity characteristics, which were historically formed in each state: a success of transformation was associated with the degree of adaptation of the liberal-democratic ideology, the development of dissident movement in the previous phase, its support among various social groups. Thus, the following subordination of the transformation factors in order of importance can be observed: the first factor – ideological, the second – political, and the third one – economic. The essential role of external factors in the process of transformation in this context means that the Eastern European elites have to learn to adjust better to the external circumstances and try to use them in order to enhance the level of security, justice and well-being of their country.

Key words: South-Eastern Europe, ideological transformation, nationalism, liberalism.

INTRODUCTION

The author's vision of the systemic transformations in the post-communist states of the South-Eastern Europe (SEE) consists of two periods – before and after 2004. The first stage of transformation, when the overriding tasks have been resolved (such as a creation of market economy and democratic governance), was completed. In comparison with the situation in 1989, the region shows a

significant progress in all spheres of public life. However, the second stage of transformation is marked by: the difference in qualitative characteristics of old and new EU's member states; the emergence of new problems in the process of transformation. The outcome of the further transformation is still unpredictable. However, it is high time to sum up the preliminary results of transformation of this region.

The reforms in SEE demonstrated that the economic sphere was not a basis for the entire transformation, and the spheres of politics and ideology didn't constitute a "superstructure", depending on this basis. The most important internal factor was a potential for the political governance in the Eastern European states, an ability of the new elites to understand and to protect the national interests, to fight against corruption and organized crime, to use the advantages of strong central bodies inherited from the previous regime. Although the economic indicators of SEE in the late 1980's were similar, the transformation process helped certain states to enter the circle of the developed countries of Europe, but the rest of them remains in the "gray zone" of instability.

The recent years proved that the countries, where the transition period from one political system to another one was full-blown, still have serious political, social and ethno-national problems. It corroborates an idea that the post-communist Europe keeps a distinction in creation of the democratic institutes of civil society; despite the European integration processes, it continues to be different from the Western Europe. According to the opinion poll conducted by Gallup agency (2006) among all regions of the world, the Central and South-Eastern Europe is the most sceptical in regard to the talking-point about democracy as the best form of rule.

SEE hesitates to make its ideological choice between nationalism and liberal democracy and a very little progress was made in this matter even after the accession of these states to the EU. In contrast, an entry into the EU on occasion can be considered as a stimulus for strengthening of the nationalist ideology in the most backward countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, where the nationalism in general is perceived as a positive phenomenon.

Consequently, the basic problems, which should be analyzed within the context of the modern ideological transformation, are the problems of nationalism and

liberal democracy, and also the influence of external factors.

NATIONALISM IN THE SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

The Bulgarian scientist P. Anchev considers that on the current international stage the biggest challenge for such small nations as the Bulgarians is a globalization, as a new kind of the colonial policy: "Small nations lose their national identity and gradually disappear from the map of Europe. The cultures of rich states prevail in the world and repress the cultures of small ones. Only the phenomenon of national culture can resist it"[1].Thereby, "nationalism" in his article looks like a unique alternative to globalization and to the loss of national identity. Now in Bulgaria more attention in focused on the research of the Bulgarian national character. The research workers note that the Bulgarians have such features as boldness and patience at the same time; realistic world view and mistrust to everything new; absence of spontaneity and initiative; disrespect for a law, order and discipline. The core values for the Bulgarians are independence, professionalism and egalitarianism, which are absolutely incompatible in imagination of the Western Europeans.

The historical dependence of Bulgaria on the international factors led to: a low level of national self-esteem, an ignorance of achievements, a propensity to imitating (copying) and worship to the foreign standards. At the same time the Bulgarians are prone to praise their history, national virtues and national pride to an excessive degree. It is reflected in a quick increase in the number of far right nationalist parties. The main reasons are, firstly, a profound crisis of trust to the political elites, secondly, major demographic issues.

Bulgaria National Security Secretary Dr. Nikolay Slatinski (2002-2006) provided the following data: for the period from 1992 to 2001 a number of the Bulgarians shrank by 8.5%, Turks – by 6.7%, while a number of Gipsies was up by 18.4%. Thus, according to projections in 2050 the Bulgarian population with 6.5 million people will consist of: 3 million of Bulgarians, 1 million of Turks and 2 million of Gipsies; other minorities will number in 0.5 million peo-

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[1]   Anchev, P.: Епоха големите беди за малките народи (Epoch of Big Troubles of Small Peoples). In: Нове време (New Times), 2004, 79 (5-6), p. 41.

ple. Therefore, N. Slatinski wrote about a necessity to encourage the ethnic Bulgarians to move to Bulgaria; a government must develop laws, which will facilitate a process of the citizenship granting to the ethnic Bulgarians[2].

Another problem of Bulgaria is related to the activities of party, which the Bulgarians consider as ethnic. Its name is "Movement for Rights and Freedoms" (MRF). This party, as writes M. Minchev, "monopolised the votes of the Bulgarian Turks, using the authoritarian, repressive control over them". MRF "extracted the whole regions of Bulgaria from the sphere of public democracy, politics and civil control. The more this octopus of ethno-corporate political control will promote its influence over the large sectors of the Bulgarian territory, the more problems will raise in relation to preserving of Bulgaria's integrity… The democratic media accuses MRF that it drove the Turks back to times before Art Nouveau, when "hoxhas and party secretaries gave orders to Turks as to dumb creatures"[3]. But the truth is that the success of MRF resided in a passivity of electors; if 80-90% of the Bulgarians voted in elections, MRF wouldn't get so many votes.

The Bulgarians chose different, but not the best in our view way, instead of the increase of civic engagement we observe the growth of nationalist activities. As a good example serves a popularity of the political party "Attack" which is in the parliament since 2005. Its victory in elections must be considered as a case of the protest voting; among those, who elected "Attack" were people of right- and left-wing views, consequently, all of them are dissatisfied. A. Todorov said that the ideology of "Attack" is a mixture of "an authoritative populism and unabashed racism"; the socialists typify "Attack" as the national socialism (Nazism).[4] The chairman of "Attack" Volen Siderov blames Jews, Turks and Gipsies for Bulgaria's hardships, is talking about their conspiracy against the Bulgarians and promising to nationalize the pillage as soon as he comes to power.

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[2] Svetlorusova, L.: Проблема национализма в Болгарии в XXI веке (The Problem of Nationalism in Bulgaria in XXI c.). In: Национализм и популизм в Восточной Европе (Nationalism and Populism in Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, p. 38.

[3] Brusylovska, O.: Ідеологічна трансформація країн Південно-Східної Європи: наростання націоналістичної хвилі? (Ideological Transformation of Countries of South-Eastern Europe: Increasing of Nationalist Wave?) In: Політичний менеджмент (Political Management), 2011, 3 (48), p. 132.

[4] Svetlorusova, L.: Проблема национализма в Болгарии в XXI веке (The Problem of Nationalism in Bulgaria in XXI c.). In: Национализм и популизм в Восточной Европе (Nationalism and Populism in Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, p. 44.

On the 19th of February, 2006 "Attack" held the anti-governmental demonstration in Sofia under a slogan "Traitors, Go to your Turks!". Right near the monument in honour of the fighter against the Turkish yoke Vasil Levski, were burned out the cardboard fezzes. On the 3rd of March, 2006 the second demonstration of "Attack" was conducted to music of Wagner that evoked associations with the fascist processions.

The most popular (and populist) politician in Bulgaria Boyko Borisov (Prime Minister from 2009 to 2016) not once spoke for his likings to "Attack", what at least gives evidence of his serious attitude in regard to this phenomenon and desire to take advantage of the electorate support, committed to this party. It's interesting to bring back to memory that as a National Security Office member, Borisov took part in the protection of crops and haylofts during the renaming campaign towards the ethnic Turks in the 1980s. But a standpoint of the President Georgi Parvanov (2002-2012), who criticised all nationalistic acts, seems to be more far-sighted. Once, flirtation with Nazism has already become a tragedy for Bulgaria, resulting in a catastrophe during the Second World War. We can only hope for the positive influence on the part of the EU and that the membership in this organization will make Bulgaria more predictable in its political and ideological transit.

The Romanian political scientist Sorin Ionita considers that the Socialism of National-Darwinist type becomes a new trend in the Eastern Europe; the author names it Nazism. He reckons George Becali among such Nazis in Romania, Volen Siderov in Bulgaria. Ionita warns the society of the underestimation of such personalities. Without regard to their obvious primitivism and lack of awareness, the oligarchs pull their strings (as it has already been in 30's of the XX century) seek for a strong power and its support.[5] Respecting the Romanian researcher's opinion, however, it should be noted that in the majority countries of the region, the Nazis views remain inherent only to the small groups of outcast. They must be explored, but we don't have to exaggerate a realness of public threat, coming from them.

In Romania after 1989 the ultra-nationalism as a political trend was represented

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[5]   Ionica, S.: Призрак умеренного нацизма бродит по Восточной Европе (Ghost of Moderate Nazism is Roaming through Eastern Europe). In: Национализм и популизм в Восточной Европе (Nationalism and Populism in Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, p. 33.

by such organisations as "The Romanian Hearth Union", "The Romanian National Unity Party" (PNUR), which began "to lose the voters" in favour of "The Greater Romania Party" after 1996.

"The Greater Romania" of Corneliu Vadim Tudor (1949-2015) not only carried the ball in parliament, but also in 1999 supported the attempt of putsch with the participation of miners. Few public organisations (The Group for Social Dialogue, Civil Alliance and the Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania – the Helsinki Committee (APADOR-CH)) demanded to forbid it to take part in the pre-election campaign of 2000, but ineffectually, despite the fact that a respective law (about an incitement to the putsch) exists.

According to "The Law on National Safety" the identification of the organisations, which are propagandizing different forms of intolerance or bigotry, is placed under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Service of Information (RSI). In opinion of George Andreescu, RSI for political reasons doesn't't enlist a couple of extremist organisations which, no doubt, are such ("Greater Romania", PNUR, "The Romanian Hearth Union", journals "Europe" and "Times"). In 2004 Andreescu named 28 extremist organisations.[6]

"Greater Romania" constantly conducts the anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic, anti-Gipsy propaganda under the slogan "The Romanians must become owners in their house". The party has strong relations with "The French National Front" under Le Pen. At the same time "Greater Romania" is supported by the majority of the Romanian Orthodox hierarchs.

For the Romanian Orthodox Church "a Romanian can only be an Orthodox". The Church often brings pressure upon the parliament; the political elites are rigidly subordinated to it: none of the party conventions begins without the Orthodox service and the politicians are obliged to take part in the denominational holidays. Andreescu considers as new threat of binding of the church with the state, and especially with the army. According to the sociological surveys 2005, the church and the army enjoy the greatest trust of citizens (83 and 74%), whereas the government – only 30%, the parliament – 23, the political parties –

[6] Andreescu, G.: Существует ли модель румыно-венгерского примирения? (Does the Model of Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation Exist?) [online]. [2016-12-12]. Available at <www.hro.org/editions/newsl/andrees.txt>.

12%.[7]

Romania has strong tendencies to nationalism in the political consciousness. The titular nation considers Hungarians, Russians (together with them are also identified Ukrainians) and Bulgarians, as the traditional enemies; Jews and Gipsies are labelled as internal enemies.

There are more Gypsies in Romania than in any other country of Europe in percentage terms (from 0.5 to 3 million people). At the beginning of the XXI century Tudor permanently was drawing attention to this problem, urging to send all Roma to the special labour camps or prisons. Unexpectedly for the sociologists during the presidential election in 2000 Tudor received 30% of votes, and his party "Greater Romania" gains more and more places at each parliamentary elections.

Today 41% of respondents declare the consent to the anti-Gipsy moods. There are Gipsy pogroms (demolitions) in the rural regions, basically with the participation of the youth organisations. It is possible to see graffiti "Death to Roma!" almost everywhere in the Bucharest subway. For Roma it is often prohibited to enter the public facilities and in the job ads is written "except Roma".

In October 2007 when the Romanian Gipsy killed a woman in Italy, the mass deportation of Gipsy immigrants from the country was started. One more scandal broke in the European Parliament. It was connected with the wedding of the younger daughter of the gipsy baron F. Choabe. When it turned out that the groom is 15 years old and the bride is 12, the English parliamentarian Emma Nicholson declared that this wedding is a "legal violence" and demanded from the law enforcement agencies to intervene[8]. The Romanian "New Right" used these incidents for promotion of their ideas in the EU countries, where they ran many campaigns, where they called the authorities for taking measures in order the Europeans began to distinguish, at last, the Romanians and the "antisocial Roma".

At the same time today it is possible to observer some positive changes: a lot of funds are allocating to integration of Roma into society; there are weekly TV

7   Ibid.
8   Bitkova, T.: Этононациональные проблемы в Румынии (Ethno-national Problems in Romania). In: Национальные меньшинства в странах Центрально-Восточной Европы (National Minorities in Countries of Central Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, p. 57.

and radio programs about life of Roma, the newspapers and magazines are publishing; the folkloric festivals and the scientific conferences are annually held. The international organisations allocate funds to projects in sphere of Roma education, to the development of their language and literature.[9]

Romania together with the European Commission developed the "Joint Social Inclusion Memorandum" (JIM). The first international European project "Decade of Roma Inclusion" was initiated by George Soros and James D. Wolfensohn and covers the period from 2005 to 2015. The program was aimed at the reduction of poverty among Roma by 80% in 10 years. Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia took part in this program[10]. The second project is "EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020" (adopted in 2011)[11].

The special support program for the gipsy-applicants was launched in1997, as to simplify the access of Roma to the higher education. Every year Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of Law, gives 5 places to young Roma, who can apply, providing a certificate or a recommendation from leaders of the Gipsy community.[12] Paradoxically it led to the emergence of a new problem: as the level of application competition is much lower than the general one, the Gipsy barons started to trade these recommendations: it is one of exceptional cases, when the Romanians want to pass themselves off as Roma.

Talking about the national problems in Romania, it is necessary to pay attention to the Jewish issue. The anti-Semitism remains a pressing issue, sometimes it is even shown at the top-levels. Paradoxically, there is only a small community of Jews in Romania (less than 10 thousand people, a half of them lives in Bucharest). From 1948 to 1988 about 300 000 Jews left the country. The majority moved to Israel, where they today make up one of its largest ethnic communi-

[9] Томова, И.: Формирование цыганской идентичности (The Formation of Roma Identity). In: Национальные меньшинства в странах Центрально-Восточной Европы (National Minorities in Countries of Central Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, p. 130.

[10] Dafflon, D.: Управление этническим многообразием в Джавахети: две европейские модели многоязычного высшего образования – Македония и Румыния (The Management of Ethnic Diversities in Dzavaheti: Two European Models of Multilingual High Education – Macedonia and Romania) [online]. [2016-12-12]. Available at <www.ecmi.de>.

[11] An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020 [online]. [2016-12-12]. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52011DC0173>.

[12] Balint, E.: Обучение на венгерском языке и меры, направленные на поддержку цыган, на факультете права в университете Babes-Bolyai (Клуж, Румыния) (Education in Hungarian and Measures toward Roma Support on Law Faculty of Babes-Bolyai University (Cluj, Romania)) [online]. [2016-12-12]. Available at <http://lgi.osi.hu/ ethnic/csdb/index-aboutRus.asp>.

ties. The ray of hope appeared when the process of restitution of the confiscated Jewish communal property was launched with the consent of the Romanian government (1997).

Transylvania issue became an integral part of the Romanian history. Transylvania is bigger in size than Hungary and makes up a third of the Romanian territory; here lives the most number of Hungarians. Romanians were always opposed to autonomy of Transylvania. The root cause is that the vast majority of Romanians consider Transylvania as a civilisation kernel of the Romanian culture. It is a homeland of Decebalus, the governor of Dacia; it is a cradle of Latin roots of the Romanian language; here in Ardyal linguistic school was a constructed and widespread a model of the Romanian identity.

The same viewpoint was always expressed by Hungary. The poet and journalist Endre Ady wrote: "There is no Hungary without Ardyal, because Ardyal has always been a genuine Hungary".[13] Therefore, the Hungarian threat was tangible all the time. But the Hungarians' negative perception was markedly affected not by the events of two World wars, but by the heritage of Ceausescu's regime, which systematically cultivated the doctrine of the Hungarian challenge.

In June 2005 the Senate after the long disputes adopted "Statute of Ethnic Minorities", which involved some forms of the cultural autonomy for the ethnic minorities and the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Meanwhile, Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), a part of the ruling coalition, espoused a view that the status of the national minorities in Romania doesn't match the EU criteria. The matter concerning the university reopening with the Hungarian as a language of instruction was the key one.

The Hungarians continue to discuss a possibility of a reconstitution of the Hungarian autonomy, where compactly live 808 thousand Hungarians. László Tőkés[14], expelled from UDMR in 2003 for his radicalism and became a leader of the movement. The national and local councils of Transylvania Hungarians were established until the end of 2003. In January 2004 they united into the

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[13]   Bitkova, T.: Этнонациональные проблемы в Румынии (Ethno-national Problems in Romania). In: Национальные меньшинства в странах Центрально-Восточной Европы (National Minorities in Countries of Central Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, p. 52.

[14]   An effort to transfer him from his post as an assistant pastor in Timişoara and to evict him from his church flat helped trigger the Romanian Revolution, which overthrew Nicolae Ceauşescu and spelled the end of the communist era in Romania.

Hungarian Civic Party (also known as the Magyar Civic Party).[15] The majority of the Romanian politicians treated the establishment of councils as the violation of the state constitution, but they didn't impose sanctions: the official Bucharest considered that the internal political stability is more important. In summer 2004 and spring 2005 the group of the Hungarian deputies advanced the legislative initiative in regard to autonomy. The project involved the creation of the presidential position, the government and even the national symbols; the Hungarian and Romanian languages were equalized; the civil servants would have to be proficient in both of them. According to the opinion polls of 2006, 78% of Transylvania population believed that the creation of autonomy was more important task than the integration of Romania into the EU. But this project was rejected as an "archaic, nationalist and separatist one that threatens chaos and interethnic clashes for Europe".[16]

More and more Romanians vote for nationalists every year; it offers new opportunities to the right-wing parties within the Great Europe. In January 2007 at the European Parliament with the active participation of Greater Romania representatives, the nationalist faction "Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty" was founded. It consisted of 23 MEPs during the 6th term. Mussolini's granddaughter Alessandra became its member. This fact allowed the British newspaper "The Guardian" to make the following remark: "The first gift of Romania to the European Union is a session of Neo-Fascists".[17] The faction formally ceased to exist in November 2007. But now the Eastern nationalists are a new alternative to the weaker Western far-right.

The sociological surveys indicate a widespread acceptance of the nationalist convictions in Romania. But in Banat, where Serbians, Czechs, Germans, Hungarians and Romanians are living together, there is a low index of the subjective perception of ethnic conflicts. Banat is a centre of cosmopolitan lifestyle. It brings certain hopes for the positive changes in mass consciousness of the Romanian society.

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[15] Andreescu, G.: Существует ли модель румыно-венгерского примирения? (Does the Model of Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation Exist?) [online]. [2016-12-12]. Available at <www.hro.org/editions/newsl/andrees.txt>.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Dribbins, L.: Перспектива решения проблем меньшинств в Европейском союзе (The Perspective of Solution of Minorities Problems in the European Union) [online]. [2016-12-12]. Available at <www.tolerance.dialog.lv>.

Macedonia still provides an example of a country, where its development is seriously slowing down by the nationalist passions. They run high both in the Macedonian and the Albanian communities. The Macedonian nationalism paradoxically amplified here right after Ohrid Agreement (2001); Macedonians consider that the central government made too many concessions to Albanians. The publishing of "Macedonian Encyclopaedia" (2009) became one of scandals, which once again proved the existence of a problem in relations with neighbours. The Prime Minister of Albania Sali Berisha named this publication "unacceptable".[18] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece officially accused the Prime Minister of Macedonia and stated that "he only wants to strengthen his image, supporting the enemies and souring the relations of his country with neighbours".[19] The Bulgarian embassy in Macedonia claimed that the publication "uses the terminology of Cold War era".[20] Most of all the Bulgarians were astounded with the statement that many outstanding figures of the Bulgarian history were not Bulgarians, but Macedonians.

At the beginning of the XXI century Vojislav Šešelj, the leader of Serbian Radical Party, published a book and characterised it himself as manual - "Ideology of Serbian Nationalism". Setting a goal to describe the main features of the Serbian national character, he distinguishes humanity, idealism, uncompromising stand, bravery, drive for freedom, unwillingness to be servants, responsibility for others and lack of talent to propagandize to the own advantage and to intrigues.[21]

Šešelj states that the creation of Yugoslavia was a historical mistake, because "the Croats and the Slovenians practised upon the naivety of the Serbians: they placed dependence on their words about a brotherhood and unity, whereas in fact the Croats always tried to destroy everything Serbian".[22] The philosophising of Šešelj is an illuminating example of the phenomenon, which scientists

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[18] Brusylovska, O.: Ідеологічна трансформація країн Південно-Східної Європи: наростання націоналістичної хвилі? (Ideological Transformation of Countries of South-Eastern Europe: Increasing of Nationalist Wave?) In: Політичний менеджмент (Political Management), 2011, 3 (48), p.132-133.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Seselj, V.: Идеология сербского национализма (Ideology of Serbian Nationalism). In: Национализм и популизм в Восточной Европе (Nationalism and Populism in Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, p. 170-173.

[22] Ibid.

describe as a specifically Serbian traditionalism, hierarchy, patriarchal character, collectivism, and authoritativeness. "Victory" of the collectivism principle over individualism is first of all connected with nationalism: the ethnic community remains a reference group for self-identification of a person. According to the data received in 2004, the authoritarianism was supported by more than 63% of respondents.[23] So, unlike the majority of the countries of SEE, Serbia still preserves some pre-modernistic features. Therefore, on a foreground is the myth about enemies of Serbia. To this group belong neighbours, great powers, ethnic minorities, the Ustaše, homosexuals, and people who have another religious affiliation. For example, the status of the Protestant church is placed on the same footing as religious sects.

Even after the overthrow of Milosevic's regime, there were many obstacles on a way to modernisation: traditional value orientations, unresolved national problems, population impoverishments, international isolation. It places a problem of Kosovo in the centre of public attention. 63% of Serbians support autonomy of Kosovo within the boundaries of Serbia, 30% are for a division of Kosovo, and only 3.7% are in favour of Kosovo independence.[24] One of the sensitive issues for Serbians is cooperation with Hague Tribunal. The majority of people are of opinion that the cooperation shouldn't include a question of extradition of their citizens (53%); 18.6% of Serbians call Ratko Mladic a hero, more than 70% answer that he is neither a hero, nor a criminal.[25]

Not only the Orthodox Church, but also the Yugoslavian scientists made a lot for a deterioration of the interethnic relations. For example, the Croatian ethnographer D. Tomasevic claimed that the Croats are democrats by nature and Serbians are inclined to authoritarianism, war and violence.

The contribution was made also by the journalists, who, for example, "found out" a biological gene that forces Serbians to hate Croats and vice versa. Therefore, the Serbian historian V. Denic sums up that "a creation of the present day

[23] Kaloeva, E.: О правах национальных меньшинств в Сербии (About Wrights of National Minorities in Serbia). In: Национальные меньшинства в странах Центрально-Восточной Европы (National Minorities in Countries of Central Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, 2007, p. 66.

[24] Brusylovska, O.: Ідеологічна трансформація країн Південно-Східної Європи: наростання націоналістичної хвилі? (Ideological Transformation of Countries of South-Eastern Europe: Increasing of Nationalist Wave?) In: Політичний менеджмент (Political Management), 2011, 3 (48), p. 134-135.

[25] Ibid.

national identity to a greater degree represents the conscious project". To his belief Serbians and Croats are going to get a future, where the significant role will be played by xenophobia and nationalism; he even designated the XXI century as "an era of awaken nationalism".[26]

The current ethnic picture of Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohija (Dukagjini)) goes through the permanent changes. The drift of non-Serbian people from Vojvodina is on the quick rise, so that an idea of the multicultural Vojvodina will lose its importance soon. The number of Hungarians is decreasing because of emigration to Hungary. On this subject V. Šešelj made a statement that he loves Hungarians so much, that he not only wishes them a safe return trip, but also "has already prepared a sandwich for them on the road".[27]

In 2002 a new "Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities" was adopted. This law contains a definition of the term "minority", but they aren't listed there[28]. The researchers note many shortcomings in the offered concept of creation of the national councils: they have no executive rights, so they can be considered only as an additional bureaucratic link, by means of which the authorities can have impact on the minorities. Among other unsuccessful laws of the post-Milosevic's period should be mentioned "Election Law" (2000), which established 5 % electoral threshold. In such a way small minority parties can hardly reach it.

Therefore, the Serbian ideological transit, under the conditions of the partial political self-isolation, is one of the close calls in respect to a dangerous combination of nationalism and populism with traditionalism, which is more or less typical for all SEE nations.

POSSIBILITIES FOR LIBERAL IDEOLOGY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Romania sets a good example of the post-communist transit without a historical

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[26] Saparev, O. Когато всички митове са (When All Myths were Exist). In: Нова зора (New Dawn), 2006, 5, p. 6.

[27] Kaloeva, E..: О правах национальных меньшинств в Сербии (About Wrights of National Minorities in Serbia). In: Национальные меньшинства в странах Центрально-Восточной Европы (National Minorities in Countries of Central Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, p. 77.

[28] Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities [Official Gazette of FRY No. 11 of 27 February 2002]. [online]. [2016-12-12]. Available at <http://www.refworld.org/ pdfid/4b5d97562.pdf>.

experience of liberal democracy. The decades of authoritarianism from Antonescu to Ceausescu, accustomed the Romanians to the expectations of a strong leader, who will solve all their problems. It's not a surprise that after the revolution this role was taken over by Ion Iliescu and today there are many politicians who use the emotional attitude of public.

A new phenomenon in the political life of Romania in 2004 was the creation of "New Generation Party – Christian Democratic" by businessman George Becali. Today, it is a striking example of populist parties. There are about 10% of electors, willing to cast their votes for it.[29]

The sociological survey firm INSOMAR conducted a research and opened for public the most acceptable features in the character of politicians. The political success of Becali was based on the advertising of his philanthropic activities in mass media, particularly on television. 34% of respondents said that Becali "is always side by side with people". The only person who could compete with him in gaining of this "close contact with people" was the President Traian Băsescu (2004-2014). The Romanians considered both politicians as "fair and decisive". C.V. Tudor was characterised as "smart, educated, good speaker", but he was accused of verbosity, rudeness and aggressiveness. Thus, in Romania the image of a "political saviour" is popular: Băsescu, a former navy captain, in such manner was a "professional" saviour, and Becali was "mystical", a person who "provides money and buys souls", as wrote a newspaper of the Romanian Social Democratic Workers' Party "Adevărul". In opinion of the sociologist Mircea Kivu, a rigid manner of making a statement is relatable for voters with the person's sincerity. Today, the collective consciousness isn't brought under control of the classic image of politician, but of the experienced person.[30] So, the latest trends in social and political life of Romania still don't confirm that Rumanians made their choice in favour of the liberal-democratic values.

It is not a mere chance that nationalism and populism to a greater extent are

[29]   Bitkova, T.: Что такое румынский популизм? (What is it Romanian Populism?) In: Национализм и популизм в Восточной Европе (Nationalism and Populism in Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, p. 90.

[30]   Schmidt-Hoer, K.: Популисты душат молодую демократию в восточных странах ЕС. Что делает их столь привлекательными? (Populists are Strangling of Young Democracy in Eastern Countries of the EU. What does them so Attractive?) In: Национализм и популизм в Восточной Европе (Nationalism and Populism in Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2007, p. 29.

present in the poorest countries of the EU. In Bulgaria a "Westerner" and liberal Petar Stoyanov stayed in power only for one term (1997-2001), later the sympathies of voters were directed at the socialists (the President Georgi Parvanov) or at the nationalists ("Attack" of Volen Sìderov). In Romania a "Westerner" and liberal Emile Constantinescu (1996-2000) was also an exception to the rule; the nationalist C. V. Tudor traditionally attracts the attention with the frankly right phraseology, the non-acceptance of "large minorities" (Hungarians and Gypsies) and as an alternative to him was authoritarian Traian Basescu.

Even today to the political elites are inherent those features, that can be connected only with the former communist regime – peremptoriness, lack of understanding of trust importance, and absence of dialogue between government and electorate. Until now in the post-communist Europe hasn't formed a culture of dialogue; a political opponent is perceived as a personal enemy.

Experience has proven that the development of democratic trends by itself does not mean a defeat of nationalism. Democracy, as a matter of principle, offers opportunities freely to designate your own interests, including national and nationalistic. Some experts believe that democracy and nationalism can co-exist, but only if the democracy is stronger and the nationalism resides in a moderate patriotic variety. Nationalism in the transitive societies can play a positive mobilisation role, strengthening people's sense of solidarity.

It should be noted that although nationalism and populism disagree with democracy, however, we shouldn't overestimate their real impact on the current transit of the post-communist Europe. The democratic system is already firmly embedded in the system of the European values and nothing can threaten it. Therefore, there is no reason to ring the alarm, but the co-existence of two ideologies in the post-communist Europe should be carefully examined, because in the long term the situation will not change.

EXTERNAL FACTORS OF POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATION IN SEE

Bulgarians do not trust to their politicians, they believe that the statesmen want only to obtain benefits, using their power; today they demonstrate more confidence in the EU leadership. O. Saparev draws attention to the strange credibility

of Bulgarians and their eternal waiting for off-board assistance: "Previously demonic West, now officially is painted pink".[31] So, the process of mythmaking was started again. In the EU, where the Bulgarians are just waiting for positive changes, not realizing that these changes should be attained by their own efforts, the Euro-illusion can quickly escalate into the aggressive Euro-pessimism. In order to avoid such a scenario, the Bulgarian government together with the European Commission should work much more than today.

The famous political scientist Ivan Krastev concluded that all citizens of Balkan countries (except Albanians) are pessimists in matters of the near future. But they think that entry into the EU is very important.[32] Thus, the external factor should play the role, which could not be played anymore by the national elite, which brought discredit on itself in the eyes of their voter.

At the same time the anti-European rhetoric is spreading in SEE; for example, this is a distinctive feature of the Romanian New Right. Their leader, Tudor Ionescu, making comment on the accession of Romania to the EU, noticed that as there was no referendum, joining ("annexation") was a project of the narrow group of politicians. For him, Romania has no influence within the EU, so the conditions for its development will be only worsened. Furthermore, according to Ionescu the EU is an atheistic organisation, which is inconsistent with the Orthodox Romanians.[33]

The EU factor in the post-communist transit still plays a very important, but ambiguous role. Hope for the EU was so strong, that when it didn't prove itself fully worth, this brought huge disappointments. The Eastern Europeans saw that the Western European countries themselves are in the process of transformation because of the globalisation impact. So, this meant that the problems of the post-communist Europe, first of all, should have been be resolved by its citizens, but they were not ready for such a turn of events. After joining the EU, the newcomers had to endure very painful reforms and as a result the attention of voters

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[31] Saparev, O.: Когато всички митове са (When All Myths were Exist). In: Нова зора (New Dawn), 2006, 5, p. 3.

[32] Krastev, I.: Не защищайте демократии от людей (Don't Defend Democracy from People) [online].[2016-12-12]. Available at: <www.uk2watch.cjm/special/oldtopic32/article.jsp?6917>.

[33] Bitkova, T.: «Свои» и «чужие» в румынском обществе ("Ours" and "Strangers" in Romanian Society). In: Системные изменения и общественное сознание в странах Восточной Европы (Systemic Changes and Social Consciousness in Countries of Eastern Europe). Moscow: INION RAN, 2008, p. 120.

shifted to the populists, who promised quickly to fix everything up. The voters often don't think about the feasibility of the politicians' pre-election promises.

All recent researches show a cessation of interest to the EU in SEE. The latest economic crisis (Great Recession) affected overall atmosphere in the Eastern European societies and their Western neighbours with a small difference. For the ordinary people from the West, this crisis is not the first one within their historical memory and an idea that a way out in large part depends on them, on the certain individuals, seems quite natural. They understand that it is necessary to cure the crisis by the joining efforts of people. The motto "Do whatever you want, but go ahead" has many supporters. But the Eastern Europeans are more likely to rely on the actions of a state. At the time of crisis they become more passive, feel a lack of confidence and can't think big. So, it is easy to predict that the economic crisis will rather comes to an end in the Western world than in SEE.

In the future the possibility of ethnic conflict development continues to persist, but its nature and severity depends mainly on the political course of the state leadership. It is also necessary to point out that any ethnic conflict can't occur on the basis of the purely local level problems; it results from the general crisis of the system of international relations and struggle of great powers in "hot" regions, being premised on their own strategic objectives.

CONCLUSIONS

The post-communist Europe is going through a process, which Attila Ágh (Head of the Political Science Department at the Budapest University of Economics and Director of the Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies) called the "post-accession crisis". Among the factors that have an impact on the "post-accession" mentality of the East European nations, first of all, should be mentioned the socio-economic life, secondly, the new political realities, and thirdly, the external influences.

The most important unsolved problems of the ideological transformation of SEE include: the experiments with the nationalist ideology, the preservation of

a specific social passivity of the Eastern Europeans as a feature that was acquired during the communist period; the new conflicts, which are only brewing in the Eastern European societies, for example, the "generation gap".

The research results of transformations in SEE can be applied practically in Ukraine. Firstly, the most important common feature of the Ukrainian and Eastern European systemic crisis is an identity crisis. Among its manifestations are some contradictions between the national identity myths and the real interests of people; over-the-top of mass consciousness to the ideological values instead of the pragmatic approach in order to tackle the major problems of social and political life; a condition of good mutual relations between state and society. As the experience of SEE has confirmed, without the development of civil society and the implementation of reforms in Ukraine, the desired results won't be obtained. Secondly, the Ukrainian conflicts discredited the ideas of independence, democracy and reforms over a period of transformation. The responsibilities should be assumed by the Ukrainian political elite. Ukraine remains a divided country, primarily because of the clan structures, which are struggling for power.

A rule for both SEE and Ukraine is that the quality of political elites in the post-communist countries is a determinative factor, which affects the perception of the country in the international arena, the ability to conduct officially declared the European integration policy. Thirdly, the South-East European experience has shown that the trajectory (direction) of transformations can be reversed at any stage of negotiations under the influence of the external factor. Therefore, although the notion of "wasted time" regarding the post-communist transformation exists, it doesn't have an irreversible character.

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