epigram to the special (abusive) type of text. Actuality of our research is related to the presence of non-uniqueness definition of the term of «enigmatic». Its use is in a wide value, as ´anything enigmatic, doubtful, unknown, stimulating curiosity; an allegory or hint´, allows to extend an idea about the types of work, based on enigmatic text. Likeness of epigram with the riddle (by classic enigmatic text) shows the single definition formulated on the basis of the educed identical specific signs: small literary genre with a variant or obligatory anthropocentric constituent, the aim of which is evaluation attribution, realized by means of adequate of enigmatic language means.

Key words: epigram, riddle, enigmatic text, invective.

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«YES» & «NO»: EPISTEMIC MODALITY OR MEMORY OF MEANING?

Summary. The present investigation focuses on the remarks that express subjective evaluation in communication and contain or do not contain a predication structure in its traditional understanding of a subject-predicate nexus. The author determines the status of the aforementioned type of utterances with the newly-suggested term «truth-evaluation remarks» and analyses their role in the process of speech interaction of the communicants, paying special attention to the utterances devoid an explicit structure of predication. The whole corpus of truth-evaluation remarks falls into three classes, two of which are polar in their appraising the situation and the third is represented by a class of indefinite remarks. A conclusion is made as to the predominance of non-predication structured utterances for making a truth-evaluation statement within the classes of both positive and negative remarks. However, the quantitative ratio of the remarks in polar classes is not the same, with the positive evaluation utterances cropping by far more often.

From the point of view of information storage and digestion, «Yes» and «No» represent mathematical absolutes of counter-polarity and function as ready-to-use clichés in speech. The psychological grounding of such truth-evaluation markers lies in the memory of meaning characteristic of human mind and functioning as systemisers of the associations that reflect the object's most important characteristics as taken in by the speaker. In fact, predominance of the non-predication structured utterances over those containing a structure of predication is explained by the absence of necessity to generate new structures of predication with there already existing non-predication structured remarks. The results of the carried-out investigation leads to the conclusion about truth-evaluation statements serving as special language units which provide communicants' feedback and direct the dialogical process, involving mental associations from the memory of meaning.

Key words: truth-evaluation remarks, positive remarks, negative remarks, indefinite remarks, non-predication structured utterances, predication-structured utterances, memory of meaning.

The last twenty years or so have seen a growing interest in the axiological features of creating characters' virtual dialogue. Considering the well-known thesis that «the body of the text is not exclusively linguistic» [4, p. 67], we believe it to be a complicated creation of inter- and extra-linguistic factors influencing speech units organisation of the information space within a meaningful unity. The present work looks at the problem of verbalising the speaker's truth-evaluation of the interlocutor's preceding utterance in terms of confirming or denying information. Our investigation is grounded upon J. Adams's conception which understands literary dialogue as a transformed form of live speech communication brought to the natural intercourse *ad maximum* [1].

As a rule, in the process of dialogisation, the speaker tries to make sure that his/her opponent understands the negotiator clearly and in the right way, and verbally probes the listener so as to clarify whether the information conveyed has been taken at all. As speech is «a multi-facet model of developing contacts between people, whereas these contacts are conditioned by the demands of their joined activity» [9, p. 128] one of its functions presupposes confirming or denying the information transmitted in the message.

Entering a process of speech communication, interlocutors pursue the objective of making an influence on each other and see the immediate result of it in the interlocutor's reaction-remark. It is quite evident that any kind of speech interaction implies a certain result, evidently seen in the determined change of all the communicants' inner worlds or at least speech behaviour. In the process of their dialogue intercourse, participants usually try to find out whether the information transmitted has been decoded and whether it has been decoded in the right way.

This paper sets up a task to find out grammatical ways of possible reactions to the statement made in the dialogue in the aspect of their truth-evaluation. We focus our attention on the non-verbal (non-structured) remarks operating as verbal signals in the dialogue to show the listener's attitude towards the given information. In English, such self-sufficient, maximum-short remarks are mostly expressed by «*Yes*», «*No*» and their derivatives (like «*Yeah*», «*Nay*», «*Nope*» etc) which are termed «truth-evaluation» remarks in our research works and analysed in the framework of the expressed modality.

The urgency of the research undertaken is motivated by the general lingual-and-epistemological topicality of all problems connected with organisation of speech communication, in general, and by the lack of sufficient information as to the ways of objectivising the truth-evaluation remarks, in particular.

The corpus for the analysis includes characters' fictional dialogue from novels of various genres which, taken in equal proportions, will ensure objective results of the research. The material covers over 3,000 examples of original literary adjacent pairs, where reactions to the given stimulus demonstrate an assessment of the source-remark as holding or not holding any truth as the addressee understands it.

A reliable form of checking up how a conversation partner takes in the transmitted message consists in putting the «closed», or «*Yes/No*» questions [10, p. 45].

E. g.:
1) «*You are quite sure Nellie Collins said that?*»
«*Yes, Frank.*» [25, p. 96]
2) — *Did I hear you right, Mr Berrett?*
— *Yes, sir, Dean Thompson.* [22, p. 67]
3) «*Oliver, is Jenny hurt?*»
«*No, Phil. No.*» [22, p. 89].

The underlined remarks in the mini-dialogues above demonstrate the listener's taking in or denying the information conveyed by the speaker.

It is accustomed to believe that the speaker's attitude towards the action or event represented in the statement is shown by different ways of expressing modality. Some scholars (like V. L. Panfilov, 1977 [12]), strictly differentiate between the so-called «objective» and «subjective» modality. However, such subdivision seems in many a case to be unnatural and inappropriate, since any utterance given in a concrete speech situation is believed to express modality from the speaker's point of view *a priori* (N. Belnap & T. Steel, 1981 [3]; L. Progovac, 1993 [6]). Thus, grounding upon there existing open or hidden modality in every remark of the character's dialogue, we consider any modality to be subjective, but «giving the speaker's evaluation of the degree of awareness of the *objectively* existing links as to the degree of trustworthiness of thought appraising the given situation» [12, p. 39] *(italics — I. M.).*

Supporting the position suggested by I. Belyaieva [7, p. 36], we believe subjective evaluation remarks to fall into two classes representing subjective evaluation remarks of two different ranks, i.e. subjective evaluation remarks of the first rank (SER 1) and subjective evaluation remarks of the second rank (SER 2). SER 1 here encompass utterances of primary explication, marked as «positive», «negative,» and «unclear» (the latter occupying an intermediate position on the scale of modality). SER 2, on the contrary, demonstrate the speaker's secondary verbalisation of his/her approval (or disapproval) of the object of speech and are used when the speaker delves into the core of his/her attitude towards the object under consideration.

Hence, we are bound to say that SER 1 are characterised by their reactionary nature and operate as part of a replying speech move on the part of the speaker. At the same time, any speech interaction, after G. Kuchinsky [8], can be brought to the following three types:
1) statement — reaction;
2) interrogative — reaction;
3) imperative — reaction.

As shown by the results of our analysis, SER 1 can function as a replying reaction to any of the three types enumerated above, defining the character of the addressee's answer to the given stimulus.

It is quite clear that very often communicative reactions are likely to differ from those expected by the speaker. This phenomenon depends upon different factors, both personal and posed by the circumstances, such as the interlocutor's disposition at the moment, his/her willingness or unwillingness to continue the conversation, his / her ignorance or lack of competence etc.

Before putting a question, the speaker tries to foresee the addressee's reaction in the way most satisfying or beneficial for him/herself. In fact, the situation of communication, as well as its efficiency, is frequently predetermined by the initiator of the talk. Hence, if planned psychologically correctly and correspondingly well-verbalised, the dialogue will take place in a friendly atmosphere and reactionary remarks will satisfy the speaker.

E. g.:
1) — *Have you anything else to say?*
— *Yes [23, p. 68].*
2) — *You haven't got neuralgia, have you?*
— *No* [23, p. 43].
3) — *Do you mean you want to buy one of our cars?*
— *Yes* [15, p. 45].

If a person initiating a conversation is tactless and violates the norms of he speech etiquette observed in the given society, if the psychological relations between the interlocutors are hostile, or if there takes place a hot argumentation in the conversation (and such situations are quite numerous), the expected reaction to the stimulus is in most cases impossible to obtain. In lots of such conversational situations, the dialogue may die away, having hardly begun. However, unfortunately the actual process of thinking does not always go hand in glove with the black-and-white mathematical logic.

Every time entering a conversation and waiting for the reaction to an informative stimulus, one faces the following question: what kind of logic is to be chosen to evaluate a thought? We argue that it depends on the communicants' intentions, in the first place, and on the speech situation, in the second.

With the stimulus structured or brought out incorrectly, or with the interlocutor willing to dodge and to avoid a concrete «*Yes*» or «*No*» type answer, there opens a field of multivalent modality for the reaction remark to be built up. The scale of modality here highlights various shades of indefinency (uncertainty), starting from remarks like «*Most probably*» and «*Perhaps, yes*», and going on to «*Maybe not*» and «*Quite unlikely*». As a side note, it should be mentioned that besides the already mentioned, there also exist epistemic modalities working in the context of ideas: «*I think*», «*I believe*», «*I guess*» etc, varying from entire certainty to absolute uncertainty [3, p. 79].

The selected corpus of examples demonstrates that not only indefinite reactions can be verbalised variously, but also the universally considered definite answers «*Yes*» and «*No*». We have found out that the positive reaction «*Yes*» correlates with the predication-structured sentences of the type «*I agree*», «*Settled*» (elliptical from → «*It is settled*»), «*All right*» (elliptical from → «*It is all right*») etc, and non-predication structured sentences like «*Certainly*», «*Of course*», «*OK*» [11, p. 248—249].

In its turn, the negative reaction «*No*» also has its predication and non-predication structured analogues, i. e. «*Nay*», «*Nope*», «*Nah*» — non-predication structured sentences, and «*I disagree*», «*Won't do*» (elliptical from → «*It won't do*»), «*Never*» (elliptical from → «*I will never do it*») — predication structured sentences.

E. g. :
1) *Did you mean it when you said she wouldn't have a job?*
— *Of course* [20, p. 22].

The non-predication-structured remark is communicatively equivalent to the positive «*Yes*»-reaction and expresses agreement with the interlocutor.

2) — *Has it occurred to you that I may be proud too?*
— *Nonsense* [16, p. 45].

The replying remark «*Nonsense*» is actually an ellipticised version of the predication-structured sentence → «*It is nonsense*» and coincides communicatively with the negative reaction «*No*».

As for the interlocutor's indefinite position, we have again spotted there both predication and non-predication structured utterances.

Grounding upon mathematical regularities, J. Lyons deduced the following syntactic formula:

$$S_{1-} \neq S_{2+},$$

where S_{1-} stands for a negative sentence, and S_{2+} for a positive one. The author claims that if sentence 1 explicitly or implicitly contradicts sentence 2, then statements 1 and 2 contradict each other [5, p. 483]. The given formula may serve as a basis for the next two formulas:

1. $S_{1+} = S_{2+}$.
2. $S_{1-} = S_{2-}$.

Hence, «*Yes*», used as a reply, demonstrates that the other communicant entirely supports his/her interlocutor's position, and the whole scheme of question-and-answer talk stipulates the continuation of conversation.

On the other hand, «*No*» operates as a negative reaction to the affirmative statement and as a positive answer to negation. It goes without saying that permanent disagreement with one's interlocutor brings a conversation to its logical end, or communicative deadlock.

Positive answers give grounds to prolonging the information-exchange process and favour the development of the conversation. Experts on business negotiations even recommend that one should purposely put questions with the already loaded positive answers when opening a business talk [10, p. 68]. Taking in the partner's position in trifles, the interlocutor may count on his/ her support in more complicated situations.

The quantitative analysis of the primary corpus of the actual material demonstrated a considerable prevalence of positive replies to the given stimulus over their negative counterparts (67.5 % to 21.1 %, correspondingly). Within each of these polar classes, domination of the non-predication-structured sentences is quite evident (see fig. 1). The latter amount to 2/3 of all remarks of the type analysed. The situation within the class of «Indefinite Remarks» is just the opposite. Comprising about 1/5 of the truth-evaluation remarks, they are represented both by predication-structured and non-predication structured remarks, with the slight overbalance of the former (6.9 % and 4.5 %, correspondingly).


Fig. 1. Truth-evaluation remarks taxonomy

Examples to figure 1:
1. Non-predication structured positive remarks.
1) — *Will you help me?*
— *Yes, m'am* [13, p. 52].
The porter agrees to help a lady carry her suitcase, thus using a non-predication structured remark.
2) *«Was he at the inquest?»*
«Certainly» [15, p. 30].
The man confirms the fact that the inspector was present at the inquest in the Bureau, using an analogue of *«Yes»*, another positive non-predication structured statement.
2. Predication structured positive remarks.
1) *«Are you sure he did not know?»*
«Sure» [19, p. 18].
The answer is positive and represents an elliptical sentence which can easily be restored from the context: *«Sure.» → I'm sure.*
2) — *You will be there by noon?*
— *All right* [24, p. 50].
Another elliptical sentence made complete by mere transformational operations: *«All right.» → It is all right.*
3. Non-predication structured negative remarks.
1) — *Did you sign the cheque for those shares? — Max asked.*
— *No* [21, p. 23].
The underlined remark is a negative answer given by means of a negative truth-evaluation remark *«No»*, an archetype of its class.
2) — *He's in hospital in Cuzco, I suppose?*
— *Nope* [16, p. 26].

Being another variant of *«No»*, *«Nope»* belongs to the same group of non-predication structured negative remarks.

4. Predication structured negative remarks.

1) *«Here, take yours price».*
«Rubbish» [14, p. 39].

Contextually-restored to the non-elliptical sentence → *It's rubbish*, the answer is a predication structured utterance and does not express the literal nominative meaning '*garbage*', but brings to naught the interlocutor's initial statement, metaphorically likening its sense to cast things and nonsense.

2) — *Will you try again?*
— *I won't* [20, p. 71].

The underlined sentence is elliptical due to the predicate's part missing and, restored to → *I won't try,* shows negation.

5. Non-predication structured remarks giving no definite truth-evaluation.

1) *«But what about your present member? Is he going to retire?»*
«Perhaps» [17, p. 44].

«Perhaps» represents a non-predication structured statement which cannot be ascribed to either positive or negative truth-evaluation remarks.

2) — *Will Uncle Bob come?*
— *Well. He seldom goes out* [19, p. 68].

The non-predication structured *«Well»* does not give any information as to the interlocutor's opinion about uncle Bob's possible visit, and though furnished with a doubtful *«He seldom goes out»*, does not provide a negative answer.

6. Predication structured remarks giving no definite truth-evaluation.

1) — *Is she a private detective?*
— *God knows* [15, p. 52].

The sentence is non-elliptical and bears a complete subject-predicate nexus, but gives no definite information as to the listener's agreement or disagreement with the inference about the girl's professional occupation.

2) — *Is she your teacher?*
— *She might be* [18, p. 38].

The predication structured sentence expresses doubt, but gives no definite answer to the question.

The established regularity points to deep psychological processes which take place in human mind and are reflected not only on the level of cognition, but on the level of language and speech as well. Taken from the point of view of information storage and digestion, *«Yes»* and *«No»* correspond to absolute values in mathematics. In speech, they function as clichés, ready-to-use markers psychologically based upon «memory of meaning», generalising and systematising associations which reflect the most important and essential aspects of the object and the way it is treated by the speaker [2, p. 54]. Hence, we can claim that meaning relations between an object of thought reference and its treatment by the speaker are fixed in human mind and marked, depending on the speaker's attitude, as (+)/(—).

These mental associations are reflected on the level of language by a special group of positive/negative reactionary units: *«Yes»* and *«No»* and their equivalents. It being so, there's actually no practical need to coin up new reactionary clichés on the level of predication structure. As for the indefinite remarks, it is every time necessary in conversation to formulate the exact degree of the indefinency (uncertainty) of the statement, which demands a certain creativity of mind, e. g. *«I don't know»* / *«I can't say»* / *«I am not sure»* / *«It depends»* etc. Those and other reactionary remarks of indifference vary in the communicative sense and are represented by syntactically different sentences.

To conclude, we must say that the results of analysis prove truth-evaluation remarks to serve as special language units which provide an information-confirming or information-denying feedback from the listener and direct the dialogical process on the whole by means of involving mental associations of the memory of meaning.

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«YES» ТА *«NO»*: ЕПІСТЕМІЧНА МОДАЛЬНІСТЬ ЧИ СМИСЛОВА ПАМ'ЯТЬ?

Анотація. У фокусі запропонованого дослідження знаходяться висловлювання, що виражають суб'єктивну оцінку в процесі комунікації, маючи або не маючи при цьому структури предикації в її традиційному розумінні як підметово-присудкового нексуса. Автор вводить для визначення статусу вказаного типу реплік термін «істинно-оцінні висловлювання» і аналізує їх роль у процесі мовленнєвої взаємодії комунікантів, приділяючи особливу увагу висловлюванням, позбавленим безпосередньо вираженої в них структури предикації. Підрозділяючи корпус істинно-оцінних висловлювань на три класи, два з яких є полярними за оцінкою, а останній є класом висловлювань невизначеної оцінки, робиться висновок про переважання саме непредикатних структур при вираженні істинної оцінки судження у класах як позитивно-, так і негативно-оцінних висловлювань. При цьому кількісне співвідношення висловлювань у полярних класах не є рівним, з явним перевищенням позитивно-оцінних реплік.

З точки зору зберігання і переробки інформації, *«Yes»* і *«No»* відповідають математичним абсолютам протилежної полярності і функціонують під час розмови як кліше, готові для використання. Психологічна основа таких істинно-оцінних маркерів лежить у властивій людині смисловій пам'яті, що служить для систематизації асоціацій, які відбивають найважливіші характеристики об'єктів та їх сприйняття мовцем. Фактично, переважання структурно-непредикатних висловлювань над структурно-предикатними пояснюється саме відсутністю необхідності породжувати нові предикатні структури при існуванні вже готових структурно-непредикатних. Виходячи з результатів проведеного аналізу, автор приходить до висновку, що істинно-оцінні висловлювання служать особливими мовними одиницями, які забезпечують зворотний

зв'язок між комунікантами і задають діалогу необхідний напрям, зачіпаючи ментальні асоціації смислової пам'яті людини.

Ключові слова: істинно-оцінні висловлювання, позитивні висловлювання, негативні висловлювання, невизначені висловлювання, структурно-непредикатні висловлювання, структурно-предикатні висловлювання, смислова пам'ять.

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«YES» И *«NO»*: ЭПИСТЕМИЧЕСКАЯ МОДАЛЬНОСТЬ ИЛИ СМЫСЛОВАЯ ПАМЯТЬ?

Аннотация. В фокусе предложенного исследования находятся высказывания, выражающие субъективную оценку в процессе коммуникации, обладая или не обладая при этом структурой предикации в её традиционном понимании как подлежащно-сказуемостного нексуса. Автор вводит для определения статуса указанного типа реплик термин «истинно-оценочные высказывания» и анализирует их роль в процессе речевого взаимодействия коммуникантов, уделяя особое внимание высказываниям, лишённым непосредственно выраженной в них структуры предикации. Подразделяя корпус истинно-оценочных высказываний на три класса, два из которых являются полярными по выражаемой ими оценке, а последний представляет собой класс высказываний неопределённой оценки, делается вывод о превалировании именно непредикатных структур при выражении истинной оценки суждения в классах как положительно-, так и отрицательно-оценочных высказываний. При этом количественное соотношение высказываний в полярных классах не является равным, с явным превышением положительно-оценочных реплик.

С точки зрения хранения и переработки информации, *«Yes»* и *«No»* соответствуют математическим абсолютам противоположной полярности и функционируют в речи как клише, готовые для использования. Психологическая основа таких истинно-оценочных маркеров лежит в присущей человеку смысловой памяти, служащей для систематизации ассоциаций, отражающих важнейшие характеристики объектов и их восприятие говорящим. Фактически, превалирование структурно-непредикатных высказываний над структурно-предикатными объясняется именно отсутствием необходимости порождать новые предикатные структуры при наличии уже готовых структурно-непредикатных. Исходя из результатов проведённого анализа, автор приходит к выводу, что истинно-оценочные высказывания являются особыми языковыми единицами, которые обеспечивают обратную связь между коммуникантами и задают диалогу необходимое направление, затрагивая ментальные ассоциации смысловой памяти человека.

Ключевые слова: истинно-оценочные высказывания, положительные высказывания, отрицательные высказывания, неопределённые высказывания, структурно-непредикатные высказывания, структурно-предикатные высказывания, смысловая память.