

по території України, ставлясь гарантом вихода України из «серой зони».

РОЗДІЛ 2. РЕГІОНАЛЬНИЙ ВИМІР МІЖНАРОДНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ

Dubovyk V.

THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA: THE ROLE FOR NATO

Великий Чорноморський регіон: роль НАТО

Автор аналізує головні зміни, що відбулися в регіоні Чорного моря у пост-біполярний період. Особливу увагу надано ролі НАТО в цих трансформаціях. Висловлюється думка про те, що роль Альянсу у регіоні зростає. При цьому НАТО у своїх діях не дотримується якоїсь чіткої стратегії регіональної присутності. Фокус зроблено на основних викликах для чорноморської безпеки та можливої ролі НАТО в реагуванні на ці виклики. Робиться висновок про те, що потенціал Альянсу є досить високим в різних безпекових сферах. Розгляду також підлягає еволюція безпекової стратегії Туреччини. Водночас робиться припущення про зростання ролі Росії у взаємодії із НАТО. У завершенні автор зосереджується на перспективах процесу розширення НАТО та можливих його наслідках.

With Turkey as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO enjoyed a presence in the Black Sea region for many decades of the cold war. At the same time it would be fair to say that NATO's role in the region was somewhat limited. The Black Sea was essentially cut away from its historically traditional Mediterranean connection, where NATO dominated. The now often discussed Caspian connection was not on the radar screen during

the cold war. Neither was the link to the Middle East that obvious. The Black Sea itself was rather under Soviet domination. However the Soviet Navy was pretty much blocked within the Black Sea area, so its capacity was effectively restrained. NATO played a certain role within cold war confrontation specifically in the Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA). Although the two opposing blocks faced each other eyeball to eyeball in the region, the Black Sea never occupied a significant position in a cold war conflict, remaining rather on the periphery.

One significant by-product of NATO's presence here was to freeze Turkish-Greek hostilities, preventing them from becoming a major conflict. Arguably the fact that both countries were in the Alliance avoided escalation and a worse scenario. Despite problems that Turkey has faced in its internal development since 1952 and all the well-known deviations from the democratic model, the situation could have been worse if it had not been in the Alliance. Euro-Atlantic integration has played a democratising role for this country, which is why the present Turkey is very different from what it was decades ago.

What has changed since the end of the cold war?

«Regional pluralism» has replaced two superpower blocs since the end of the cold war. The six post-Soviet states — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine — take an active part in shaping the landscape of regional security. Romania and Bulgaria now make their own substantial contribution in this process (as team players in both EU and NATO). In addition to particular new states- players we also do see here a number of international organizations, blocs and alliances, which were not present here before (i.e. OSCE), or have been here but with a smaller role (i.e. NATO), or even has not existed in the cold war times (i.e. EU).

Clearly, NATO is one of those to be looked at with extra attention. Much has changed here, as elsewhere, since the end of the cold war. A NATO's freer access to the WBSA has become a reality with the dissolution of its major adversary from the cold

war times. The NATO-led military exercises are taking place on a regular basis. Most of other countries in the WBSA have expressed an interest in working with NATO, including (but certainly not limited) under the framework of the «Partnership for Peace» program and some of them did follow with an intensive agenda of partnership.

The events of 911 and the post-911 era has influenced the WBSA to a certain degree and, one might argue, the NATO's role in the region. We now have three NATO members here instead of one with Bulgaria and Romania joining the Alliance. This has clearly advanced the NATO's reach to the WBSA. The NATO's operations in the Balkans and, even more so, in Afghanistan have elevated the significance of the WBSA for the Alliance. In broader sense, the proximity of the volatile Greater Middle East, including the Near East with its Arab-Israeli tension, adds up to a strategic value of the WBSA. The Ukraine's and Georgia's applications for the NATO MAP have contributed to the significance of the WBSA as far as NATO's future is concerned.

The current role for the Alliance

a) a bigger role?

So, the basic question is whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization now have a bigger presence in the region of a Greater Black Sea than in the years before? Even this seemingly unambiguous question might have very different answers. One line of thought on this is that NATO now has grown in its regional role in the recent years. It now has three members here instead of just one, which is by itself a growing presence (and this is not just mathematics — addition of Bulgaria and Romania have added a lot to the Alliance's potential). Also, the Alliance participates in various military exercises in the region, which surely was not possible even some years ago. Finally, the WBSA consists of either NATO members, or NATO aspirants, or NATO partners. This has even led some few years ago to a conclusion of the Black Sea becoming a sort of «NATO lake». This line of thought would lead to an assumption that there is no other big

players in the region but NATO and that there is no alternative but for the WBSA to become a part of a large expanding zone of Euro-atlantic security.

A different idea would be that NATO is just one of many other influential security actors in the region, while some of those actors are not necessarily pro-NATO (to put it mildly in case of Russian Federation). Indeed, the security vacuum that has emerged in the WBSA with the end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union is still very much in presence. While we witness a bunch of security initiatives (including those initiated by NATO) that suppose to contribute to the elimination of the above-mentioned security vacuum, it is still here.

b) combination of challenges for NATO

Indeed, it makes a lot of sense to argue that a variety of challenges for the regional security has grown in our immediate past. The traditional «hard security» problems have not gone away or vanished in any way. The issues that have to do with correlation of military forces in the region, introduction of new weaponry, military basing and more — all of this is very much in the spotlight. At the same time, obviously some new (in format and in nature) challenges have emerged.

Some of these newer challenges in the Greater Black Sea region have to do with strictly speaking maritime security. Here the role of NATO is an awesome one. The Alliance is helping to coordinate activities of the Black Sea littoral to address this type of concerns. However, clearly everyone should be involved in this for the process for it to be successful: the non-NATO countries should be part of it and make their own contributions.

It should be noted here that, as we know it, the WBSA is very much a heterogeneous one when it comes to many criteria — political models, levels of economic development, ideological differences, military capabilities, etc. For instance, the spread of democracy, which should be seen as a critical pillar of real security, is, unfortunately, far from being firmly ensured in the

region. Countries here range from mostly democratic to imperfect democracies to some that do not even see their objective in institutionalising a liberal democratic model. In the last years we have seen a heated debate on the future of democracy in the WBSA, which has, among other things, led to a number of regional initiatives, such as Organization for Democracy and Economic Development GUAM, Community for Democratic Choice, Black Sea Forum, etc.

In our opinion, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a tremendous potential, as it used it before, to serve as an active agent in democracy promotion. With this we can surely refer to the notorious criteria for membership, which has even more to do with certain assignments in political, legal and socio-economic aspects than with purely military issues. With two current aspirants for the MAP in the region — Georgia and Ukraine — the NATO has already played a role of a democratic watchdog. We could remind here that when president Saakishvili has allegedly used an excessive force against the opposition in his country, it was NATO that was the first to state that this behavior does not stand in line with the Euro-atlantic values. The Alliance has not missed many opportunities to criticise Ukrainian leadership for some of its undemocratic moves. We also remember of the insistence by NATO that the very decision of Ukraine to apply for the membership in the Alliance should be preceded by and based on the broad discussion within the country.

The argument goes that the Black Sea flank of NATO is far from being finalised. As of right now it is definitely not up to its ideal shape. Supposedly this particular remains as a weakest one of those regional dimensions in NATO's posture. Numerous factors have contributed to this: the scope and nature of challenges that Alliance faces here, internal discussion within NATO on what it should do here, specific nature of the Alliance' regional partners (weakness of institutions, level of commitment to Euro-atlantic choice, etc), and also a growing opposition of Russia in the WBSA. Bulgaria and Romania have taken their part in security building in the region,

but clearly they are not capable of having a determining influence on the outcome of this process.

A factor of Turkey

In looking at the NATO's role in the region one should pay primary attention to the role of certain countries (some within and some outside of the Alliance). Turkey is naturally one of them. A NATO's forpost in the region for decades Turkey continues to play a vital role. However, it is impossible not to notice that Turkey is presently undergoing a process of having a strategic reassessment of its regional priorities, interests and objectives. Turkey looks into its role in the WBSA. It looks like Turkish security identity might shift somewhat.

It must be stressed out that nothing presupposes Turkey «leaving» NATO in any way. There appears to be a consensus on this in the country. At the same time, Turks are taking a second look at their place in the Euro-atlantic cooperation and more concretely — at what this membership gives to Turkey. Specifically, Ankara is assessing its relations with NATO's greatest power — the United States of America. There were several significant considerations and developments that have contributed to this ongoing debate.

Turkey is becoming stronger player economically and militarily turning into a «regional superpower». It also does have some ambitions with regard to the Turkish-speaking nations in the region. The Kurdish separatists and the positions taken on this issue by various powers is of significance to Ankara. The growing energy cooperation with Russia is a critical factor here as well. Questions remain as to the nature of the Russian-Turkish rapprochement (its basis, its format, whether it will be a strategic one). Assuming that this cooperation will flourish and NATO-Russia relations will stay at their current low point or even deteriorate, this would create a certain dilemma for Turkey (and for NATO for that matter).

The Turkey has been kept at the doorstep of the EU for decades (way too long as far as Turks are concerned). Significantly, neither

US, nor NATO (for obvious reasons, perhaps) were being able to help Turks in achieving their priority task of becoming an EU member. The Turks begin to think about unthinkable — what happens if Turkey will not be allowed to enter EU ever. This might lead to a serious correction of some previous attitudes. And there is no doubt that this rethinking would have an impact of the Euro-atlantic dimension of Turkish policies.

The U.S. war in Iraq, as it is widely known, has had a profound impact on the American-Turkish relations. Turks were not fond of this Washington initiative anticipating (correctly for the most part) quite few negative consequences of the U.S. intervention. The very unwillingness of some NATO allies to commit to defending Turkey in case it would come under attack because of the American intervention in Iraq was very unheartening for Ankara. The freedom enjoyed by Iraqi Kurds has worried Turkish government. These and some other considerations have affected the relations between Turkey and the leader of the Euro-atlantic community — the United States.

Most finally, one could not help but notice a gradual growth of Islamism in Turkey in the recent years. This manifests itself in both party politics and public sentiments. It is way too early to even try to predict the results of this process of Islamization, which will develop over the years to come. But we are seeing some first outcomes, one of them being that Euro-atlantic set of values might not get well along with Islamic values. Surely this would create some dilemmas for Turkey in its regional policies; primarily in its southern dimension, but also in the WBSA.

All of this contributes to a different position of Turkey with regard to NATO's presence in the WBSA. Perhaps, it would be an exaggeration to tell that Turkey is up to preventing NATO (US) from more actively entering the Black Sea region (after all Turkey is a member of NATO). However, we might say that some Turkish claims that it (along with other countries in the Black Sea region) is fully capable of securing this area, first, could be seen as opposing broader NATO participation and, second, simply do not match the

reality. It is our view that the WBSA does need an outside help in solving its security problems, and there is much that entire NATO could and should do to address those problems.

Indeed, there has been quite a few regional security initiatives in the WBSA in the recent years. This includes the Turkey's favourites — The BlackSeaFor and «Black Sea Harmony». Both of them, though, are far from being efficient and viable tools for enhancing regional security and addressing the existing and emerging challenges. This has been obvious in the recent years and, from our point of view, will become even more evident in the coming years. The BSEC, GUAM and others are not as active as we would like them to be and, in any case, being poorly equipped to address the broader security concerns in the region. OSCE barely deserves to be mentioned with this regard. This leaves NATO with its resources and potential as an only viable collective security mechanism for the WBSA. (EU might eventually emerge as a powerful force in securing the area, but it will take a long time before this actually happens, while the numerous security concerns are very real and call for immediate action).

The Russian factor

Along with Turkey Russia deserves to be mentioned as another individual state whose position is having a strategic influence on the future role of NATO in the WBSA. The Russian federation is having rather ambivalent relations with NATO. For a number of years one was to call this Moscow's position a schizophrenic one: formally stated cooperation, but underneath was barely hidden hate. On the one hand, the Russian Federation was involved in the unprecedented amount of joint activities with NATO. It still enjoys a very special status of a privileged special partner of NATO. Russia has a huge mission in NATO HQ. At the Bucharest 2008 summit the Russian then president V. Putin was there as a very special guest.

On the other hand, the Russian political elite, its military and public are deeply suspicious of NATO. They do not see NATO as a partner, let alone ally or friend. Moscow has objected to all recent waves of NATO's eastward enlargement and remain even more

staunch opponent of Ukraine and Georgia joining the Alliance. The Russian ruling class has initiated a wide-scale and well organized anti-NATO campaign in Russia itself and in what it calls «a near abroad». At the same time, there never were any coherent and clear explanations on the Russian side as to why they see NATO as a threat and specifically how they see its future enlargement as a menace to the interests of Russia.

This hardly gives us an opportunity to see a rosy scenario in the future NATO-Russia relations. Among other things, Russia remains absolutely determined to prevent NATO from playing a more active role in the WBSA. In other words, there will be no more ambivalence there in Russia's position: one of the earlier expressed (existed) attitudes towards NATO has pretty much evaporated now. Certainly, the chance of NATO working together with Russia for the sake of having more security in the WBSA should not be ruled out completely at the moment. However, unfortunately, this chance does look as very much a slim one. Too many differences remain: ideological among them, but even the views as to the very nature of the threats to the regional security differ dramatically.

Big questions for NATO and the region

In the meanwhile, there is much that NATO could do to address the immediate security concerns of the WBSA. It should be noted that NATO is in position to provide the right type of security, the one of higher quality and that corresponds to the most challenges of today, including the «soft security» threats. This happens as NATO is based on its Euro-atlantic values and standards. This means that NATO-led security will bring not only physical safety that is based on number of tanks and war planes, but also a broader sort of security, which would allow also for protection of human rights, free and fair elections, free press, economic growth, social development, etc. It would allow to address the grave environmental and energy challenges, problems of illegal trafficking of humans, drugs and weapons — all being faced by the WBSA. Also, as it was mentioned

above, there is a reason to believe that NATO will continue to be an active agent for a democracy promotion, which would be highly welcome in the region.

There are several critical, existential questions the answers to which will be in position to influence the NATO's role in the WBSA in the years to come. First, it should be noted that the process of the transformation of NATO, its adaptation to the security situation, which was generated by the end of the cold war, is now still far from being over. The Alliance takes time to define its new mission, functions and ways to achieve its objectives. We are witnessing both the conceptual search and the institutional evolution as well. The discussion within the Alliance is often very heated, which is very natural for each of the member has its own interests and agenda. At the same time, it should be noted that with all challenges and difficulties the NATO is facing today, it is not in crisis. In fact, in our opinion, these current problems should lead to an even stronger NATO. As it stands now the Alliance is the one and only effective and reliable mechanism of securing the Euro-atlantic space.

Second, the future of NATO, and its role in the WBSA, will be determined to a large extent by the outcome of the ongoing discussion on the enlargement of the Alliance, which could proceed in two major areas — the Balkans and the WBSA. As it appears now, the NATO members are far from having a consensus on this matter. But the consensus should better be found relatively soon, for its lack is blocking NATO's potential in the Black Sea region, not to mention that is putting on halt the security aspirations of the candidate-countries (and somewhat jeopardizing their present security standing).

Third, the debates on the NATO's activities outside of its traditional area of responsibility is of utmost significance. The result of NATO's mission in Afghanistan is a substantial issue. The discussion on the so-called «caveats» will be the one to watch. The very basic understanding as to where NATO operates and how the members should contribute must be based on common position.

One should understand that the proper lessons of Afghanistan should be drawn. Depending of what sort of lessons there will be for the Alliance its future role in the WBSA will emerge. Assuming the «isolationist», retreatist attitude to prevail this will lead to a more limited, restrained stance of NATO and not only in the WBSA. On the contrary, if NATO to conclude that it should stay the course of reaching outside of that once traditional area, becoming a more assertive global player and, among other things, remaining a security player in the Wider Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia, this would call for a more active role for the Alliance in the WBSA.

Finally, much will depend on NATO's relations with outside powers, other actors in the region. Naturally, it is going to be crucial to see if NATO is joined by friendly partners in the region or, alternatively, by those opposing the Alliance. With this regard surely one should watch closely the NATO — Russia relations.

Unfortunately, at the moment NATO does not have a clearly set strategy or vision for the WBSA. One might speculate as to the reasons for this: internal ongoing debate on NATO's mission in today's world, preoccupation with recent waves of enlargement and current mission in Afghanistan, willingness not to irritate Russia, which considers WBSA its own back yard, etc. However, this strategy should emerge and better sooner than later. Without it NATO is doomed to be acting here blind. The time has come for the Alliance to come to a conclusion as to what does WBSA mean for the Euro-atlantic security, what sort of challenges exist (or might emerge) here and what methods should be used to counter those challenges and to bring more security to the region.

Potential members?

As Turkey is thinking about its regional role and Russia is turning into the antagonist for the Alliance, the newest members — Bulgaria and Romania — are only learning to be part of the working security arrangement. Moreover, both of them are clearly lacking resources to promote the Euro-atlantic presence in the

region. With this being said, as NATO goes on in working with and through its three existing members in the WBSA, it should also think about other potential members here, who would enable the Alliance to play a more active role in the strategically important WBSA.

With current three member-states in the region the regional flank for NATO is not completed. The ex-Soviet space is not included in the process of enhancing regional security. Some cooperation does take place, but full membership is needed for a number of aspirant-countries. This list should not be limited to Georgia and Ukraine, but must be open also for countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The current state of affairs (leaving the above mentioned post-Soviet states outside of NATO) does undermine decisively the ability of the Alliance to play a more sound role in providing more security and prosperity for the WBSA.

Clearly the recent escalation of violence in South Caucasus instigated by the conflict over South Ossetia would have an impact with this regard. The attempt of military solution for the South Ossetian problem (whatever motivation was behind it) does not put Tbilisi in a positive light for the Alliance. However, the Russian aggression, which followed, had put this Georgia's operation in a shadow. The accent has shifted. NATO members do feel that they need to support Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, the instruments to do this are very limited. So, what this means in terms of chance for Georgia to join NATO? In our view, this chance is very low now. A number of NATO member states would only reiterate their position that Georgia should not be let in due to the danger of damaging the Alliance's relations with Russia even more and further sliding into the full scale cold war with Kremlin.

Paradoxically, the violence over South Ossetia does not change much for Ukraine's prospect of becoming NATO member either. Those in Alliance who thought that Ukraine should be protected from Russia have only received more evidence. However, the others would firmly stick to their stance of relations with Russia being a

priority comparing to the faith of Ukraine. At the same time, the dividing lines within Ukrainian society with regard to the potential membership have not changed either. In what Russia did towards Georgia some saw exactly the reason for Ukraine to run to NATO as soon as it can, and others — just the opposite. Having said this, a pity it is but the strategic interests of the country have once again appeared to be a token in the domestic infightings. To further isolate the president and to appeal to a predominantly anti-NATO electorate Yulia Timoshenko has dropped her support for the membership and moved closer to the Party of Regions. However, these positions by both above mentioned political forces are very opportunistic and might change as situation changes. The prospect for Ukraine to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains alive and still, in our opinion, as needful as it always was.

ЧФ РФ В КРИМУ ЯК СКЛАДОВА ВІДНОСИН В ТРИКУТНИКУ УКРАЇНА—РОСІЯ—НАТО: ПЕРСПЕКТИВА 2017

Прогресуюча практична та науково-аналітична зацікавленість в Чорноморському регіоні як перспективному епіцентрі додаткових зовнішньополітичних можливостей свідчить про високий ступінь актуальності субрегіональних чорноморських проблем на міжнародній арені, особливо в останній час. «Чорноморський вимір» поступово стає все більш вагомим напрямком зовнішньої політики не тільки чорноморських країн, що само по собі природно. До Чорного моря потягнулися стратегічні інтереси широкого кола позарегіональних держав, ТНК, міжнародних організацій. Кожна з шістки безпосередньо чорноморських країн, включно з Україною, зосереджує свої регіональні інтереси в площині військово-стратегічній, економічній, енергоресурсній, транспортній, екологічній, транскордонній, інформаційній. У контексті процесу сучасної регіоналізації світового простору, в справі створення дієвої системи міжнародної безпеки і співпраці в Євроатлантичній зоні для України все ще актуальним завданням є вироблення цілісної, концептуально обґрунтованої чорноморської політики, що відповідає сучасним геополітичним інтересам України. Й саме в тому регіоні, де все ще є небезпека як затягування різноманітних вузлів протиріч, так й «розморозки» цілої низки конфліктів, не говорячи вже про їх остаточне вирішення.

В останній час все частіше постають питання забезпечення саме енергетичної та територіальної безпеки української держави, «стріли» загроз яким — як об'єктивні, так й суб'єктивні — проходять саме Чорним морем. Але якщо в контексті